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ABSTRACT 
Participants (,N = 69) were exposed to a stressful event by watching a violent videotape, 
and were told that certain scenes had appeared that in foct had not People were randomly assigned 
to either hear a theory of memory repression or not, and then mentally rehearsed a preselected, 
counterbalanced group of real and fake scenes over a two-day period. Major dependent measures 
were reported memory characteristics for scenes and confidence that scenes had appeared in the 
videot^. Analyses were conducted using a subsample of witnesses (N - 48) who had no missing 
data on crucial measures. All conditions contained equal numbers of people. People who were 
exposed to a repression-and-recovery memory theory were expected to report more detailed 
memories and to express more confidence that they had witnessed fake scenes than people who 
were not exposed to such a theory. This effect was expected to be enhanced as the number of 
rehearsals increased. Neither prediction was confirmed. Exposure to the repression theory had no 
effect on confidence or memory for scenes in any condition. Rehearsal and scene type produced 
main effects, and interacted with each other to influence both confidence and memory for scenes. 
As predicted, real scenes were recalled better than fake scenes, and people were more confident 
that they had seen real scenes than fake scenes. Rehearsal improved memory for real scenes, but 
not for ^e scenes. In contrast, confidence that both real and fake scenes had a^^ared in the 
videotape improved following rehearsal. The memory-theory manipulation aj^ars to have been 
unsuccessful not because people were reluctant to believe in the possibility of repression per se, 
but because they were uix:onvinced that they had repressed information in tliis situation. People 
appeared to accept the suggestion that they had witnessed scenes they had not, and their 
confidence increased after being encouraged to rehearse the scenes a number of times, even though 
no improvement in memory resulted. Accepting the suggestion that hidden memories exist may be 
the first step toward creating false memories. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of tbe modem world's most serious social concerns is the sexual abuse of children. 
Broadly defined, child sexual abuse includes both contact (e.g., touching or kissing, attempted or 
forced intercourse) and non-contact abuse (e.g., forced viewing of pornography or masturbation, 
"flashing"). Recent research indicates that die sexual abuse of chUdren is prevalent in Western 
societies. On the basis of surveys of adults in the United States, it is currently estimated that one 
tenth of all men and between one fifOi and one fliird of all women have experienced sexual 
victimization prior to the age of 18 (e.g., Finkelhor, Hotaling, Lewis, & Smith, 1990; Russell, 
1988). Data from women's self-reports bolster these estimates. More than 30% of women in 
numerous samples report having experienced some form of sexual abuse as a child or adolescent 
(Finkelhor et al., 1990; Lofius, Pollonsky, & Fullilove, 1994; Russell, 1983,1986; Wyatt, 1985). It 
has been suggested that such retrospective data actually underestimate the prevalence of child 
sexual abuse (e.g., Williams, 1994). Underlying ttiis argument is the premise that self-report 
measures are subject to biases of omission. Some women may be embarrassed to report abusive 
experiences. Some may not have defined early sexual experiences as abusive, and so fail to report 
them when questioned as adults. Some may have forgotten the experiences, and, it is argued, some 
may have repressed the memories. 
How valid is the assumption regarding repression? A recent rash of reports of memories of 
childhood abuse suddenly being "recovered" by adults in psychotherapy has fueled a debate among 
members of the psychological, psychiatric, and mental health communities over the concept of 
repressed memories. At issue in Oie debate is whether the emerging images are veridical 
representations of long-buried trauma, or whether they are simply manifestations of suggestive 
psychothen^y (e.g., Lindsay & Read, 1994,1995; Loftus, 1993). A rough division of opinion 
between psychotherapists and cognitive scientists can be drawn, although by no means all 
members of either group agree with the predominant view. To oversimplify, therapists tend to 
believe that the repression and recovery of memories for traumatic experiences is possible, even 
probable. On the basis of clinical experience, they argue that there is no reason to doubt the 
accuracy of the memories generated by their clients, and that the prevalence of such reports 
supports their validity (e.g., Blume, 1990). Similarly, thers^ists claim that the use of various 
memory-recovery techniques is supported by their iq)parent success at uncovering hidden memories 
of abuse. Cognitive scientists, on the other hand, have argued that the concept of repression does 
not fit with what we know about normal memory processes, and that the reliable recovery of 
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decades-old memories is unlikely, if not impossible (e.g., Loftus, 1994). These research-oriented 
psychologists urge clinicians to search for supporting evidence, carefully examine empirical 
findings, and consider the possibility that die indiscriminate use of memory-recovery procedures 
might inadvertently create false memories of abuse in vulnerable clients. 
The implications of this debate become obvious when one looks at the effect it is already 
having on the American legal system. Some thers^ists are urging clients to file lawsuits against 
remembered abusers. The goals of such actions have been described in terms of psychological 
healing, and of gaining retribution for years of mental suffering and distress stemming from 
alleged childhood trauma (e.g., Bass & Davis, 1992). A few years ago, bringing such suits would 
have been difficult, if not impossible. However, as a direct result of the publicity surrounding a 
few high-profile reinessed memory cases, severe states have recently lifted their statutes of 
limitations on sex crimes against minors such that compensation for damages is now possible years 
aliter the alleged crime took place (see Emsdorff & Loftus, 1993). States that have applied these 
new rules generally allow three years to bring charges, not from the time of the crime, but from 
the time the crime was recalled. Thus, adults who claim to have recently recovered memories of 
childhood abuse now have recourse against idleged perpetrators. Under the "delayed discovery 
doctrine," civil suits are now possible in at least 20 states, and some states allow filing criming 
charges. These changes have resulted in an increasing number of suits being brought against 
alleged abusers on the basis of delayed recall. Ofshe and Watters (1993) reported that over 300 
suits had been filed against abusers in the U. S. alone, and by the end of 1994, the False Memory 
Syndrome Foundation reported that they were tracking around 800 such suits (Lipton, 1994). 
Attorneys and law firms have begun to specialize in handling recovered-memory lawsuits (e.g., see 
a list in Bass & Davis, 1992). However, legal proceedings have not been one-sided. Alleged 
perpetrators, mostly parents claiming to have been falsely accused, are beginning to fight back. In 
a landmark case, a CiOifomia court recently ruled in favor of an accused father who sued his 
daughter's then^ist for neglect of duty of care, charging that the therapist had helped his daughter 
recover false memories of abuse (Ramona v. Ramona, 1994). The debate among members of the 
mental health community over the audienticity of recovered memories has been made public as 
psychological scientists and clinicians have been called to provide expert testimony in high-profile 
cases. It is clear that the outcome of this debate will have serious consequences not only for the 
parties engaged in courtroom battles, but for the various branches of the mental health professions 
as well. 
3 
Theoretical Basis for Beliefs in Repression and Recovery 
The concept of repression originated in early psychoanalytic theory (Freud & Breuer, 
1893/1971). In a series of influential works outlining his "seduction theory," Freud explained how 
the roots of adult psychopathology could be traced to sexual experiences in early childhood (e.g., 
Freud, 1894/1971,1896/1971,1915/1971). On the basis of case-study data, Freud concluded that 
adults who exhibited neuroses almost invariably had suffered a traumatic childhood event of a 
sexual nature. According to Freud's theory, knowledge of such an experience could be so 
threatening that a person's ego-defenses would be engaged and all memories associated with the 
event would be repressed, or pushed into the unconscious recesses of the mind. By blocking the 
threatening material out of consciousness, rqsression would effectively bury the memories 
associated with the traumatic event, but the psychological and emotional damage would remain. 
Repressed memories could reside undisturbed in a person's unconscious for many years, exerting a 
powerful influence over everyday life. Freud believed that the nature of hidden memories could be 
revealed through such techniques as free association and dream analysis, and argued in an early 
paper that uncovering and reliving the pivotal childhood experience was die only way to efiTect a 
lasting cure for adult psychopathology (1896/1971). 
An adq)ted version of Freud's theory provides the foundation for modem-day diagnosis 
and treatment of suspected survivors of childhood trauma. The basic theoretical tenets remain the 
same, including the focus on repressed or hidden memories of childhood sexual experiences. Many 
psychother^ists assume that traumatic childhood events (e.g., childhood sexual abuse) can produce 
long-lasting effects, often manifesting as physical, emotional, or psychological disturbances in 
adulthood. When symptomatic clients profess no history of abuse, some therapists assume that 
abuse did in fact occur, but the traumatic memories have been repressed. Modem-day repression 
has been broadly described as ttie complete banishment from consciousness of all memories 
associated with abusive experiences that occurred in one's childhood (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). 
Not all dierapists endorse die idea of repression Some prefer to characterize the process 
by which memories are blocked from consciousness as "dissociation" or "flitting." Regardless of 
preferred terminology, many psychotherapists share three basic beliefs: that traumatic childhood 
experiences can influence adult iimctioning, that memories for those experiences can be blocked 
from consciousness, and that hidden memories can be recovered in essentially unaltered form. 
Certain techniques are assumed to be effective at uncovering hidden memories, and the recovery of 
traumatic memories is thought to be of utmost importance for eventual healing. These belief form 
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the foundation of what have been tenned "memory recovery therapies" (see Lindsay, 1994; 
Lindsay & Read, 1994). Although long-forgotten memories of chUdhood sexud abuse sometimes 
surface qx)ntaneously outside of the context of psychotherapy, memory recovery ther^ies seem to 
be the principal setting in which such traumatic memories are recovered (see Lindsay & Read, 
1995). Cognitive scientists have called into question tiierapies that actively seek traumatic 
memories where none currently exist. 
Characteristics and Prevalence of Memory Recovery Therapies 
In addition to a common theoretical base, memory recovery therapies share a reliance on 
various techniques and practices that are considered controversial by memory researchers and other 
scientists (Lindsay, 1994; Lindsay & Read, 1994,1995). For example, some therapists use 
hypnotic age regression (i.e., encouraging clients to "relive" their childhoods while hypnotized) to 
help clients remember hidden histories of childhood sexual abuse (Andrews et al., in press). 
However, various professionsd organizations have cautioned that tiie use of hypnosis and certain 
other techniques may increase the likelihood of creating illusory memories or false beliefs in 
clients (e.g., American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, 1985; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1993; British Psychological Society, 1994). In general, concerns about 
memory recovery ther!q)ies focus on the suggestibility of the methods used to uncover hidden 
memories, the inability of practitioners to discriminate between true and false memories, and the 
apparent unwillingness of practitioners to consider alternative explanations for clients' problems. 
Clients suffering a wide variety of afflictions are quickly identified by memory recovery 
therapists as possible victims of childhood trauma, mainly sexuid abuse, even in the absence of 
supporting memories. Early and confident diagnoses are facilitated by the belief that any number 
of presenting problems are indicative of having been sexually abused. To assist in identifying 
potential abuse "survivors" (i.e., adults who as children suffered abuse), therapists can refer to 
various symptom lists that have been developed in clinical practice with women who report such 
histories (e.g., Blume, 1990; Engel, 1989). These authors of these checklists encourage users to 
consider the possibility that unresolved issues stemming from traumatic childhood abuse may 
underlie such diverse symptomatology as sexual dysfimction, relationship problems, eating 
disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, multiple personality disorder, and partial or complete 
absence of memory for portions of childhood. People showing symptoms but lacking memories for 
childhood abuse may be told that complete amnesia for childhood sexual abuse is common. One 
oft-quoted passage from the best-selling self-help book The Courage to Heal reassures people that 
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"If you think you were abused and your life shows the symptoms, then you were." (Bass & Davis, 
1992, p. 22). 
In order to access memories of childhood ^use, clients are urged to engage in various 
forms of "memory work" (see Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). Numerous techniques and practices (e.g., 
dream analysis, guided imagery, hypnotic age regression) are prescribed or provided with the aim 
of recovering memories of childhood abuse. Oients lacking memories for childhood trauma are 
also advised to join abuse survivors' groups and to read self-help books that describe exercises 
designed to assist in remembering sexual abuse. 
What one discovers by following the latter advice are detailed instructions for various 
memory recovery techniques and a theory to support their use that is consistent with early Freud 
(e.g., Herman & Schatzow, 1987). Over 100 years ago, Freud said that if one wanted to cure the 
symptoms of hysteria, one needed to cause "an unaccomplished reaction to be completed" by 
compelling tte patient to "experience (the trauma) a second time, but imder hypnosis," thereby 
allowing a release of the emotion associated with the traumatic memory (Freud, 1896/1971, p. 39). 
Modem-day clinicians (e.g., Courtois, 1992; Frederickson, 1992) and other writers (Bass & Davis, 
1992; Blimie, 1990; Engel, 1989) repeatedly stress that solving one's problems is possible only by 
uncovering and facing hidden trauma memories head on; only by doing so can the trauma's power 
over one's life be defused. For example, in The Courage to Heal, Bass and Davis write, "Survivors 
often doubt their own perceptions. Coming to believe that the abuse really happened, and that it 
really hurt you, is a vital part of the healing process" (p. 58). Similarly, Engel writes: 
Rather than forgive and forget, you will be freed only if you remember and release 
both pain and anger. You will need to ... remember and relive the experience ... 
and confront those dark shadows and villains, once and for all, so they can be 
banished forever.... Remembering these filings, reliving the experience, can 
only serve to relieve their intensity.... Hie key to beginning recovery is to bring 
your experiences out in the open. This will rob the abuse of its potency, (p. 4) 
Although evidence for the popularity of the theory and techniques associated with memory 
recovery ther^y is not difBcult to find in self-help books, one might ask how widespread such 
belief and practices are among highly trained professionals. Indirect evidence comes from the 
prevalence of therapeutic case reports and treatment recommendations recently published in books 
and professional journals (e.g., Briere, 1989; Courtois, 1992; Herman, 1992; Laidlaw & Malmo, 
1990; Ratican, 1992; Richardson, 1994). These authors, and others, express the belief that the 
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absence of memory for portions of one's childhood is a reliable indicator of hidden trauma, 
provide as evidence case examples in which clients who initially had no memories of childhood 
abuse eventually developed them, and offer suggestions for how to go about recovering hidden 
memories of childhood trauma. 
More direct evidence of die prevalence of memory recovery therapies comes fiom a recent 
survey of the beliefs and practices of psychother^ists from a variety of disciplines (Poole, 
Lindsay, Memon, & Bull, 1995). Licensed doctor^ psychotherapists, randomly selected from two 
national registers in the United States and Great Britain, completed a survey regarding their 
therapeutic practices with women who were known or suspected survivors of childhood sexual 
abuse. They were also asked to state their opinions about memories of childhood sexual abuse 
recovered in thers^y. Responses indicated that the majoritj' cf highly trained psychotherapists do 
not focus on treating survivors of childhood sexud ^use, but a sizable minority of therapists tend 
to see many cases. For example, although two thirds of the therapists indicated that less than 10% 
of their female clients m the last two years had reported histories of childhood sexual abuse, 
approximately 20 therapists (10%) said 30% or more of their clients had reported such histories. 
Over twice as many therainsts (23%) believed that childhood sexual abuse was an important factor 
underlying the psychologic^ distress of tudf or more of their clients. Thus, many therapists seem 
to believe that childhood trauma underlies much adulthood psychopathology. 
Therapists in the survey (Poole et al., 1995) were also willing to endorse the concepts of 
repression and recovery. When specifically questioned about repressed memories of abuse, most 
therapists indicated that they had occasionally formed the opinion that a client who initially denied 
having been tisasieA as a child probably had such a history, and a majority endorsed the belief that 
it is important to remember the abuse. However, there was little agreement among therapists as to 
what might indicate a history of abuse. Of the 85 indicators listed, only 22 were agreed upon by 
more than 5% of tiier^ists (n = 166). In fact, when averaged across the fliree samples, the 
highest-ranked indicator (sexual dysfimction) was listed by only 14% of therapists. Likewise, 
although most therapists reported using at least one memory recovery technique with their clients, 
there was a distinct lack of agreement on which techniques they considered acceptable. Therapists 
seemed to be somewhat blind-sighted when it came to their own practices. Whereas nearly all 
therapists thought it was possible for a client to come to believe she was sexually abused as a 
child even though no abuse had occuned, very few suspected it had happened with their clients. 
Bnally, 25% of therapists were identified as "memory focused." To meet this criterion, therapists 
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had to indicate a belief that memoiy recovery is important for successful theriq)y, that they 
sometimes formed the opinion that a client had been abused who denied it, that they were 
sometimes fairly certain of such a diagnosis after only one therapy session, and that they used two 
or more memory recovery techniques with suspected survivors of childhood sexual abuse. Most 
important, memory-focused therapists were over twice as likely as other therapists to report that 
their clients eventuaUy recovered sexual abuse memories in ther^y. 
Hie data provided by Poole and her colleagues (1995) indicate that although 
memory-recovery therapy may not be the norm among highly trained psychologists, a substantial 
minority make the treatment of hidden sexual abuse their primary focus. Furthermore, a majority 
of psychother£q>ists believe the theory behind recovered memory ther^y to be valid, and have 
used at least one technique to uncover repressed memories of abuse in their clients. Extrapolating 
to the wide range of registered and nonregistered therapists practicing in the United States and 
Britain, Poole et al. estimated that well over 100,000 women have worked with memory-focused 
psychotherapists in the past few years. Given this estimate, it is easy to imagine that substantial 
numbers of people may have recently recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse that may or 
may not have actuaUy occurred (see also Lindsay & Read, 1994). 
Prevalence of Repression and Recovery of Childhood Sexual Abuse Memories 
How common is it to have no memory for childhood sexual abuse? Several studies have 
addressed this issue (e.g., Briere & Conte, 1993; Feldman-Summers & Pope, 1994; Herman & 
Schatzow, 1987; Williams, 1994). Herman and Schatzow reported that of 53 women in group 
therapy for incest survivors, 64% "did not have fidl recall of the sexual abuse" (p. 4). However, 
only those women who "reported that they had always remembered the abuse in detail," had not 
been aware of any major memory gaps, had not recently recalled any new memories, and did not 
recover additional memories in the course of ther^y were judged to have no memory deficits (p. 
4). Hius, women who may have recovered memories after entering ther^y or who may have 
experienced normal decay of memories for decades-old events were included in the 64%. In a 
similar study, Briere and Conte gathered data from 420 women and 30 men in individual or group 
therapy who reported having experienced forced sexual contact before the age of 16 with someone 
five or more years older. Two hundred sixty-seven people (59.3%) responded affirmatively to the 
question, "During the period of time between when the first forced sexual e;q)erience happened 
and your eighteenth birthday was there ever a time when you could not remember the forced 
sexual experience?". In a survey asking 330 therapists about their personal experiences with 
8 
cbildhood sexual abuse, Feldman-Summers and Pope reported tiiat 41% of those who admitted to 
such a history said diat there had been times when they could not remember the abuse. 
Critics of these studies (e.g., Loftus, Pollonsky, & Fiaiilove, 1994; 0£she & Watters, 1994) 
have pointed out that people in therapy for childhood sexual abuse may be subject to a number of 
biases, including overestimating their own probability of having been abused, that may unwittingly 
influence their responses. In addition, the way the key questions were worded may have resulted in 
misinterpretation. R)r example, in ttie Briere and Conte (1993) study, it cannot be determined how 
many people who responded afBrmatively meant that there had been a period of time when they 
had not wanted to think about, or had not actually thought about the forced sexual experience. 
Although these three studies indicate that many people may report temporary or partial memory 
deficits for alleged abuse, these results should not be interpreted as evidence for widespread 
amnesia for abuse. 
Loftus, Pollonsky, and Fullilove (1994) attempted to address these criticisms in their own 
study. Fifty-two women who reported childhood sexual abuse histories responded to an item 
asking them which of tiiree descriptions best characterized their abuse memories. Sixteen of the 
women (31%) indicated some degree of forgetting. Specifically, six women (12%) reported that 
they had remembered only parts of the abuse their whole lives, and 10 women (19%) reported that 
they had forgotten the abuse for a period of time, but had the memory return later. Although much 
lower, these figures still suggest that a substantial proportion of people who report having been 
abused will have experienced some temporary lack of memory for the Incidents. However, two 
criticisms remain relevant to this study: The participants were women undergoing treatment for 
substance abuse, which may rely on similar theories and techniques as sex-abuse ther^y (e.g., 
group therapy, hypnotic suggestion), and again, the wording of the key item is rather confusing, so 
results must be interpreted cautiously.^ Only one study with a non-clinical population has been 
reported to date. Sheiman (1993) surveyed 196 undergraduate students regarding their histories of 
' The question instructions read: "People difBer in terms of how they remember their abuse. Which 
of the following e;q)eriences best characterizes your memory? 1. Some people have ^ways 
remembered their abuse throughout their lives, even if they never talked about it 2. Some people 
have remembered parts of the abuse their whole lives, while not remembering all of it 3. Some 
people forget the abuse for a period of time, and only later have the memory return." (Loftus, 
Pollonsl^, & Fullilove, 1994, p. 75) It is possible that some people may have responded according 
to their beliefs about other people rather than describing their own memories. 
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childhood abuse. Of the 12% who lepwted having been sexually abused in childhood, half said 
that there had been a period of time during whidi they could not remember the abuse. 
In a recently reported study, 129 women were re-interviewed 17 years after having been 
brought to a hospital as children following reports of sexual abuse (Williams, 1994). When asked 
to report on childhood sexual abuse experiences, 38% did not mention the incident that had 
brought them to the hospital, or any other incident involving the same perpetrator. Williams 
concluded that "having no memory for child sexual abuse is a common occurrence" (p. 1173), but 
critics have suggested idtemative explanations for her data (Loftus, Garry, & Feldman, 1994). 
Williams noted that women who did not report the target event tended to be yoimger at the time of 
the abuse than the women who were able to report it. The women in the study ranged in age fiom 
10 months to 12 years old when diey were first brought to the hospital. These facts suggest at least 
two idtemative explanations. First, it is possible that some of the women who did not mention the 
target childhood event did not understand the meaning of the event at the time it occurred. Second, 
at least some women may have been susceptible to normal childhood amnesia for the events, as 
they occurred within the first few years of life (for a discussion of infantile amnesia see Howe & 
Courage, 1994). Even if it is assumed that the girls were old enough to imderstand and remember 
at the time of the alleged abuse, the fact that many women did not report memories for the events 
in question does not mean that those memories were repressed, as some have claimed (e.g., Kandel 
& Kandel, 1994). Rather, it is more reasonable to assume that the women simply forgot the abuse 
(Loftus, Garry, & Feldman, 1994). 
Hiese six studies provide the best data regarding how ofien childhood sexual abuse 
memories might be at least temporarily forgotten. It remains difficult to reach a firm conclusion 
regarding the prevalence of repression for childhood sexual abuse memories. Repression and 
forgetting are not the same thing. Inherent to a definition of repression as it is currently understood 
is the possibility of relatively complete memory recovery. Many events that have been temporarily 
forgotten may later be remembered, but it is unlikely that the memories will be completely 
accurate. As I will describe in a later section, normal memory is prone to all sorts of deficits and 
decay. Thus, the most defensible statement one can make regarding the probability of repressing 
recoverable memories of childhood sexu^ abuse is that somewhere between 19% and 64% of self-
identified survivors have experienced at least some period of forgetting for at least part of their 
abuse experiences. 
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The evidence siq)po]ting belief in repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse comes 
mainly from self-reports of clients who claim to have recovered memories for abusive experiences, 
and from case reports and surveys of psychothen^ists who claim to have seen such clients in 
therapy, or who claim to have successfully used memory recovery techniques to uncover buried 
abuse memories. What is the value of such evidence? 
Critique of "repression and recovery" evidence 
Symptom checklists. It is assumed that symptom checklists provide valid indicators of 
abuse. Several lines of evidence indicate that this is a fallacious assumption. First and foremost, 
symptom lists (e.g., Bass & Davis, 1992; Blume, 1990; Engel, 1989) have been compiled by 
psychotherapists who specialize in treating the sequelae of childhood sexual abuse, and include 
characteristics common to their clients. Because no independent corroboration was sought 
regarding whether or not clients were actually abused, it is likely that these symptom lists are 
based both on self-identified victims of childhood abuse and on women who were identified as 
survivors on the basis of their symptoms alone. Obviously, this circularity is problematic. Using 
symptom lists to diagnose childhood sexual abuse runs the risk of identifying as survivors both 
women who have and have not actually been abused. 
There are other jn^oblems. Symptom checklists are complex and often contradictory, and do 
not indicate what number or combination of symptoms is necessary to make an accurate diagnosis 
of abuse. It has been charged that, because the checklists include everything, they are diagnostic of 
nothing (e.g., Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). Hiere are 34 general categories listed on Blume's "Incest 
Survivor's Aftereffects Checklist," and many include multiple, often opposite, characteristics (see 
Blume, 1990, pp. i-iv and xxvii-xxx). For example, one category includes "Trust issues: inability 
to trust (trust is not safe); total trust; trusting indiscriminately," and another, "High risk taking . . .  
inability to take risks" (p. ii). Tlie most controversial syn^tom is perhaps "repression of 
memories," which appears under the heading "Denial" dong with "having dreams or memories," 
having "sensory flashes," and "remembering the surroundings but not the event" (p. iv). As this 
example demonstrates, even a lack of memories is no deterrent to an incest-survivor diagnosis. In 
fact, in combination with telltide signs of trauma, a lack of memory is seen as a prime indicator 
that one is repressing memories of childhood sexual abuse (e.g., Engel, 1989, p. 2, writes, "If you 
have ever had reason to suspect that you may have been sexually abused, even if you have no 
explicit memory of it, the chances are very high that you were"; see also Bass & Davis, 1992; 
Blume, 1990). 
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Tbe use of symptom checklists as a diagoostic tool rests on the assumption that a pattern 
of symptoms exists that reliably reveal hidden childhood abuse. There is little evidence, however, 
to indicate that a consistent set of symptoms, or "post-sexual-abuse syndrome" can be identified 
(Beitchman, et al., 1992). Support for diagnoses of childhood sexud abuse in the form of hard 
evidence (e.g., medical or police records) would seem crucial. It is unlikely, however, that such 
evidence will be sought in the context of Oier^y (Herman, 1992; Lindsay & Read, 1994). 
Therapists have asserted that their role is not to investigate whether or not abuse claims are valid; 
ratber, their duty is to provide support and encouragement as dieir clients struggle to come to grips 
with possible past trauma (e.g., Blume, 1990). However admirable in spirit, this may be a 
somewhat dangerous practice. Indiscriminate use of symptom checklists without the benefit of 
corroboration may be subject to the charge that diagnoses of abuse in the absence of memory are 
indicative of nothing but the therapst's predisposition to believe everyone has been abused. 
Repression. Although no one doubts the potential of the human mind to cope with 
horrific experiences in creative and unusu^ ways, the main problem with the evidence for 
repression is that it is anecdotal. It has been argued that the only evidence for repression comes 
from "psychoan^ysts who presume the existence of the repressive mechanism" (Ofshe & Walters, 
1993, p. 5). This conclusion is based in part on the lack of agreement among therapists as to 
which symptoms might be taken as reliable indicators of repressed memories, and in part on a lack 
of evidence in support of the concept of repression. In fact, in a review of over 60 years of 
experimental research. Holmes (1990) concluded Aat there is no convincing evidence that supports 
the existence of repression. Long before the advent of such research, even Freud had abandoned 
his seduction theory, recanting his early belief that adult neuroses were produced by traumatic 
sexual experiences in childhood that had been repressed (see Herman, 1992; Freud, 1894/1971). 
Instead, Freud came to believe that the coercive sexual experiences described by his patients were 
fantasized rather than truly experienced. As Reud was driven to reassess his theories and 
interpretations regarding repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse, so too are modem 
psychological scientists. Doubts about the existence of repression and what is considered to be its 
shaky theoretical foundation run to the extreme. One prominent critic recently wrote, "Recovered 
memory therapy is an example of the maxim that those who ignore history are doomed to repeat 
it" (see Ofshe & Watters, 1993, p. 7). 
Memory recovery. Most psychologists believe that it is possible that some people with 
no recollections of childhood sexual abuse were actually abused but do not remember the 
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experience (Poole et al., 1995). Cognitive scientists consider it uidikely, however, that memories of 
traumatic childhood experiences might be recovered in [Histine form years later, in adulthood (e.g., 
Loftus, 1993; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). Few, if any, events in a person's life are later perfecfly 
remembered. Many autobiographical memories may contain only elements of truth that have beei. 
mixed with interpretations and suggestions to form convincing, but inaccurate stories (e.g., see 
Loftus, 1979). Ihus it is not the simple forgetting and later recall of events that is in question, but 
the mechanism of repression and the possibility of complete and accurate recovery of memories. It 
should be pointed out that no one doubts that flie sexual abuse of children is all too common in 
our society. Few doubt the stories of people who say they were abused and have always 
remembered it, or that there were times when they did not think about the abuse. Even fewer 
doubt the sincerity of people's beliefs that they were abused in childhood but only recently recalled 
it What many doubt is the veracity of newly-iecovered memories of decades-old ^Aiuse that were 
previously not recalled, or even suspected (e.g., Lindsay & Read, 1994,1995). 
Anecdotal evidence that recovered memories are suspect comes firom the reports of the 
False Memory Syndrome (FMS) Foundation. The FMS Foundation is a noiqirofit organization 
based in Philadelphia that, among other things, provides information and support services to 
parents claiming to have been falsely accused of abuse by their adult children. Representatives 
report logging over 17,0(X) phone calls since the inception of the Foundation in 1989 (personal 
commimication, October 27,1994). Over 2500 people had become members of the organization by 
the end of its fifth year in existence. The membership includes a growing number of "retractors," 
people who have come to believe that the memories of abuse they recovered are in fact untrue. 
Retractions of abuse allegations that were based on formerly repressed memories have been widely 
reported (e.g., "Childhood sexual abuse?", 1993; Jaroff, 1993; Loftus, 1993). The FMS Foundation 
reports having conducted extensive interviews with 175 retractors, and to have received phone 
c^s about an additionsd 125 undocumented retractions (personal commimication, October 27, 
1994). Although it is unknown at this time how many of these people recovered abuse memories 
while involved in therapy, FMS representatives report that over half of the retractors they have 
spoken to or heard about are suing their former therapists. Although there is no evidence that the 
people who have contacted the False Memory Syndrome Foundation are innocent of abuse or that 
retractors were not actually abused, the figures reported by the FMS Foundation suggest that the 
accuracy of at least some recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse may be questionable. 
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What makes the false-memory claim more convincing is the fact that several professional 
organizations (notably, flie American Medicsd Association, American Psychological Association, 
and American Psychiatric Association) are looking into the possibility that certain techniques being 
used in therapy are ill-suited for the purpose of memory recovery. Public statements regarding this 
issue have warned that the use of such techniques may produce confidently held, but false, 
memories that in most cases are indistinguishable from real memories (e.g., American Medical 
Association, 1994; AMA Council on Scientific Affairs, 1985). Thus, memory-recovery therapies 
that incorporate suggestion, such as hypnotic age regression, sodium-amytal interviews, dream 
interpretation, and guided imagery, have been labeled "risky" and are not recommended (Lindsay 
& Read, 1994). 
Evidence against repression and recovery 
Normal memory processes. How likely is it that long-lost memories may suddenly be 
recalled in conq>lete and accurate form after many years have passed? Research on normal 
memory processes indicates that the answer is "not very likely at all." The idea of complete 
repression and complete subsequent recovery of traumatic memories does not fit with what we 
know about normal autobiogr^hical memory (see Lindsay & Read, 1994). The human perceptual 
system has been likened to a video camera, capable of accurately recording all stimuli in its focus 
and retaining them indefinitely. By this analogy, memories for events long past would be stored 
indefinitely in their original form, able to be called forth at some later time when they might be 
relived in their original intensity. Memory deficits are taken to indicate repression, and the 
accuracy of returning memories is assumed. In fact, recovered memories of decades-old abuse are 
often described as vivid, detailed recollections, complete with smells, feelings, and sounds. But are 
they accurate? 
Evidence for the permanence of long-term memory is weak (Loftus & Loftus, 1980). 
Forgetting or other difficulties may occur at any stage of processing. Normd memories fade over 
time; forgetting is gradual and continuous (Squire, 1989). Without rehearsal or repetition, memory 
traces are subject to decay. Thus the failure to report a memory is often due to normal limitations 
of memory. When they are reported, normal autobiographical memories are rarely complete, and 
even more rarely are they completely accurate. Under the best of circumstances, detailed 
descriptions of past events may be difficult to produce, and harder to substantiate. Because it is 
clear that the human information processing system has limits, the analogy to a videotape recorder 
is simply not accurate (Loftus & Loftus, 1980). Given the breadth of the evidence regarding the 
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limited nature of normd himian memory, it seems safe to say that lack of recaU is not valid 
evidence of repression, and memories that are eventually reported may not necessarily be accurate. 
Memory for traumatic events. Some therapists cite the emotional intensity of memory 
recovery as evidence that the resulting memories must reflect previous traumatic experiences (e.g., 
Bass & Davis, 1992). No one doubts that memories of abusive experiences might cause intense 
psychic and emotional pain when carried throughout a victim's life. There is little evidence, 
however, that people completely bury memories fra: such traumatic experiences. Data generally 
agree that people tend to retain long-term memories for at least parts of certain traumatic incidents 
they have experienced (e.g., Christianson & lx)ftus, 1987; Terr, 1991). For instance, Terr (1983, 
1988) has reported two studies of children's long-term memory for traumatic events. In the first 
study, 25 children whose school bus had been hijacked were interviewed 4-5 years after the event. 
In the second study, Terr interviewed 32 children who had experienced various sorts of "psychic 
trauma." Terr reported that the memories of both groups of children remained "fairly accurate" 
across the time spans studied. What these examples demonstrate is that, at the very least, 
repression is not the rule in the experience of horrific events. 
Although total repression is unlikely, most people who report having experienced traumatic 
childhood ^use consistently report some degree of forgetting (e.g., Briere & Conte, 1993; Herman 
& Schatzow, 1987; Loftus, Pollonsky, & Fiillilove, 1994; Williams, 1994). Evidence fi'om a 
controlled laboratory study indicates that although memories for the gist of traumatic events may 
be retained over time, memories for the details of those events tend to be impaired (Christianson & 
Loftus, 1987). Research on children's memories for relatively recent traumatic experiences also 
supports this finding (Terr, 1983,1988). Although Terr's studies generally supported the long-term 
accuracy of children's memories for traumatic events, many of the children's reports were 
incomplete or contained distortions. On the basis of this evidence, it is clear that even memories 
for s^ent traumatic events are subject to omissions and errors of various kinds. 
Research supporting the suggestibility of episodic memory 
Numerous sources recount emotionally charged stories of survivors describing recently 
unearthed memories of childhood abuse (e.g., Lx)ftus & Ketcham, 1994). Many accounts are 
replete with detailed descriptions of sights, sounds, smells, and sensations. Recovered memories 
are often recounted with difficulty, accompanied by great emotional distress. Recurring questions 
ask. Why would anyone make up such horrible stories if they were not true? Why would anyone 
put themselves through such pain? Although scientists and therapists generally agree that few 
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people deliberately make up memories, scientists argue that many recovered memories are likely 
the products of suggestive influences (e.g., Undsay & Read, 1994; Loftus, 1993). Memory 
recovery tiierapies may provide an environment in which recovering traumatic memories is 
encouraged, and even expected. Hiis section ouOines possible mechanisms by which illusory 
memories for imaginary events might be generated. 
Misleading su^estions. It is widely agreed that memory reports are subject to external 
suggestion (e.g., Lindsay & Johnsoii, 1989; Loftus, 1979; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Tversky 
& "nichin, 1989; Wells & Loftus, 1984). Evidence regarding the msdleability of episodic (i.e., 
event) memory reports comes from numerous studies that have used a misleading post-event 
information paradigm (Loftus, Miller, & Bums, 1978). After witnessing an event or series of 
events, people are exposed to misleading suggestions imbedded in a series of questions about those 
events. When later given a memory test, people often report memories consistent with the 
misleading suggestions rather than with the actual events that were witnessed. Although such 
studies do not conclusively show that event memories are irrevocably changed by exposure to 
misleading information (Zaragoza, McQoskey, & Jamis, 1987), they do show how easily memory 
reports can be influenced. 
A slightly different type of study shows the influence of misleading suggestions made in 
conjunction witti one type of risky memory recovery technique, hypnosis (Laurence & Perry, 
1983). While under hypnosis, 27 highly hypnotizable people were told they had experienced an 
event that did not actuidly occur: that loud noises had woken them up one night the week before. 
When questioned about the event post-hypnosis, the reports of 13 people were consistent with this 
suggestion. Even after being told that the memories were merely suggested imder hypnosis, six 
people remained "unequivocal in their certainty" that they had actually been awakened by the 
noises (Laurence & Perry, 1983, p. 524). Other studies with highly hypnotizable people have 
shown how the power of suggestion can create pseudomemories for such unlikely traumatic 
experiences as past-life abuse (Spanos, Burgess, & Burgess, 1994) and satanic ritual abuse (Ofshe, 
1992). 
Source monitoring confusions. Even in the absence of hypnotic suggestion it has been 
demonstrated that people sometimes create memories for traumatic events that they did not 
actually experience. In a field study, 133 children were interviewed about a real-life sniper attack 
that had occurred at their grade school playground (Pynoos & Nader, 1989). Several children 
reported distorted memories of the attack. Specifically, some children's reports placed them nearer 
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the action or in more danger than they had actually been. For example, one child reported coming 
out of the school building to see the assailant standing over the body of her friend on the 
playground, but in fact the sniper had shot from across the street Another child reported having 
been quite near the sniper when the shooting began, but in fact she was half a block away, safely 
out of the line of fire. Presumably, the children incorporated into their own memories stories they 
had heard from other children who had actually been traumatized by the experience (Loftus, 1993). 
Anecdotes aboimd illustrating similar confusions between events that people actually 
experienced and events that they were only told about One oft-related anecdote involves 
psychologist Jean Piagef s memory of an attempted kidn^ing when he was two years old (see 
Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). Piaget \ividly recalled the view fiom his stroller as his nanny struggled 
to fend off the kidn^>per, and even vaguely recalled die resulting scratches on the nanny's face. 
For so heroically defending him, Piaget's nanny was rewarded with a watch. Evidently the 
experience weighed so heavily on the nanny's mind that she eventually returned the watch with a 
letter explaining that she had made up the entire incident Piaget has forced to conclude that the 
memory he recalled so vividly from his childhood must have resulted not from having experienced 
the event but from having repeatedly heard the story told to him as a child. 
This type of source monitoring confusion (i.e., difficulty distingui^ng the origin of one's 
memories) has been studied extensively in controlled laboratory experiments with both children 
and adults (see Johnson, 1988). In one study (Haugaard, Reppucci, Laurd, & Nauful, 1991), 142 
girls in preschool and kindergarten (ages 4 to 7.3 years) twice watched a videotape in which they 
saw a man and young girl interacting. Later in the video, the girl lied about the interaction, saying 
she had been assaulted by the man. The children were questioned about the events in the videotape 
immediately after watching it Consistent with the lie the girl in the videot^ told but not with the 
actual events depicted in the tape, 41 children (29%) reported that the man in the videotape had hit 
the girl. Thus, these children were willing to report having seen what had oidy been suggested, 
even though the girl's story was inconsistent with what they had actually seen. This apparent 
source monitoring confusion is noteworthy for two reasons: First it occurred for an event that is 
similar in content to many traumatic recovered memories; and second, it occurred despite the fact 
that the children iq)peared to pay close attention to the events as they occurred, and appeared 
motivated to respond correctly to questions about the events they had witnessed. 
Reality monitoring errors. Reality monitoring errors (Johnson & Raye, 1981) 
compose a specific category of source monitoring confusions involving difficulties in 
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disciiminating between real and imagined events. Johnson and Raye proposed that several types of 
information associated with memories (e.g., perceptual and contextual aspects) help distinguish 
between real and imagined events. For exan^le, memories for real events tend to be more vivid, 
complete, and more easily generated than memories for imagined events (Johnson, Foley, Suengas 
& Raye, 1988). Sometimes, however, imagined memories may be especially intense, or have other 
characteristics that make them seem real (e.g., recurrent nightmares or fantasies involving everyday 
situations may seem especially realistic). 
Suengas and Johnson (1988) have recently demonstrated that rehearsal (i.e., mental 
repetition) of certain aspects of imagined events can greatly influence their seeming reality. 
Participants in fliree studies were given a series of events to actually perform (perceived events), or 
to simply think about performing (imagined events). Over a period of days, they were asked to 
rehearse perceptual, cognitive, or affective aspects of the perceived and imagined events. 
Participants then completed a 39-item questionnaire assessing the characteristics of their memories 
for each event Rehearsal increased reporting of thoughts and feelings associated with imagined 
events. In fact, repeated rehearsal of apperceptive event characteristics increased the thoughts and 
feelings associated with imagined events to the point that Ihey became indistinguishable from 
perceived events along this dimension. In addition, rehearsal increased perceptual characteristics 
(e.g., clarity) associated with both kinds of memories. Suengas and Johnson (1988) postulated that 
repeatedly rehearsing imagined events while failing to rehearse perceived (actual) events would 
increase the similarity of memory for these types of events along perceptual dimensions as well, 
making reality monitoring extremely difficult In other words, differential rehearsal of certain 
aspects of memories for real and imagined events might reduce discrepancies between such 
memories to the extent that they could become indistinguishable from one another. 
"Memory implantation" studies. Recent experimental research has addressed the 
question of whether or not memories for traumatic events can be induced by repeated suggestion 
(Loftus & Coan, in press). Anecdotal evidence for memory implantation based on this unpublished 
study has been widely described (e.g., Lindsay & Read, 1994; Loftus, 1993; Loftus and Ketcham, 
1994). Hve people (two children, one adolescent, and two adults) were led to believe that they had 
experienced a mildly traumatic event that they had not actually experienced (having been lost in a 
shopping m^l or department store at age 5). On several occasions, participants were asked to work 
on remembering the event Adult participants were also asked to record their memories in a journal 
(as clients in psychotherapy might do; see Lindsay & Read, 1994). After varying amounts of time 
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and rehearsal, all five participants began to report vivid and detailed memories of the shopping 
mall experience (e.g., feeling panicky, crying for their mothers, etc.). One boy even reported a 
detailed description of ttie man who he said had found him and returned him to his mother. Loftus 
has concluded that this study provides evidence of the ease with which false memories of 
traumatic childhood events can be implanted, and has suggested diat memories of traumatic 
childhood events "recovered" in therapy may be the products of similar influences. 
Hiis study, and the conclusions drawn from it, have been criticized on several grounds 
(see Olio, 1994). AlOiough family members expressed dieir belief that the study participants ha.d 
never actually been lost in a shopping mall, it is possible that participants were remembering 
actual experiences that they had never reported to anyone. The experience of getting lost as a child 
may have a high base rate in the population, whether often reported or not More importantly, it 
has been argued that the recovery of a memory of this sort is qualitatively distinct from the 
recovery of abuse memories in then^y in several ways. The shopping-mall experience is a single 
event, but clients in therapy often recover memories for multiple traumatic experiences. The 
trauma associated with being lost in a shopping mall is obviously much less severe than that 
associated with chQdhood sexual abuse. In some cases, the memory was suggested by a trusted 
sibling or another authority figure to a suggestible child. Adults may be less suggestible. 
Nevertheless, there are direct parallels between the situation created in this experiment and 
recovered memory therapy. For instance, an authoritative experimenter may be analogous to a 
trusted therapist, and people in therapy may well be highly suggestible. It is important to note that 
although ethicsd considerations necessitated that the event used in this memory-implantation 
experiment be relatively mild, participants still created detailed, confidently-held memories. 
Despite criticisms, therefore, it can safely be concluded that it is possible to induce the experience 
of illusory memories for at least mildly traumatic events. 
The question of iatrogenic memories 
Studies demonstrating reality monitoring confusions (e.g., Suengas & Johnson, 1988) and 
misinformation effects (e.g., Loftus & Coan, in press) show that it is possible to influence people's 
reports of what they remember about everyday and even mildly traumatic events. Leading 
suggestions about events, whether made under hypnosis (e.g., Laurence & Perry, 1983) or not 
(e.g., Haugaard et al., 1991), can have a powerftil impact on memory reports. Repeated rehearsals 
can even increase similarities between memories for real and imaginary events (e.g., Suengas & 
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Johnson, 1988). What do these lines of lesearch suggest about memory-iecovery therapies? Might 
illusory memories of abuse be created in therapy? 
Several elements seem to be in place in memory-recovery therapies that are likely to 
increase the risk of inadvertently creating false memories of childhood abuse. According to 
research in the area of social influence (e.g., Petty & Caccioppo, 1986), message-related variables 
such as argument strength and repetition, and individual-difference variables such as personal 
relevance, motivation, and openness to persuasion all affect the likelihood that a person's beliefs 
will be affected by persuasive messages. All of these factors are pertinent to memory recovery 
therapies. People entering therapy may be highly motivated and highly suggestible, looking to the 
therapist for answers to long-standing problems that they have been unable to solve by themselves 
(see Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). The therapist may £q)pear to be a powerful and credible somce of 
knowledge, offering wisdom based on years of clinical experience or higher education. The 
therapist may provide assurance that other people with similar problems have found solutions with 
his or her help. The trust placed in the therapist, who serves as both confidante and ally, may 
increase clients' willingness to accept the suggestion that childhood abuse may underlie their 
problems, and may also increase their willingness to try to remember what might have happened to 
them. 
Several other elements common to memory-recovery therapies may be particularly 
problematic. Poole et al. (1995) have established that many psychotherapists are using various 
sorts of suggestive techniques to prompt the recovery of memories for childhood sexual abuse, 
including instructions to work at remembering, instructions to give free reign to the imagination, 
joumalling (e.g., writing down anything remembered about one's life that might reflect a history of 
abuse), guided imagery (i.e., leading the patient through imagining possible abuse scenarios), 
hypnosis, and dream interpretation (i.e., interpreting elements contained in dreams consistent with 
a sexual abuse theme). Several of these memory-recovery techniques freely encourage the 
formation of images and repeated attempts at recall. As research on reality monitoring shows, 
events that exist as products of the imagination alone can begin to seem more real with repeated 
generation (Suengas & Johnson, 1988). Lindsay and Read (1994) have argued that, whereas these 
techniques might be helpful for people who really were abused, they are likely to be unduly 
suggestive for people who have not Combining multiple suggestive techniques in a prolonged 
search for hidden memories may make memory-recovery therapies particularly dangerous: The 
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expectation of finding trauma under tbese circumstances may promote ttie creation and confident 
reporting of £alse memories for events that never actually occurred (Lindsay & Read, 1994). 
Taken together, research on persuasion and the suggestibility of memory provide 
convincing arguments supporting the possibility that false memories may be created in therapy. 
Memory-recovery tiierapies may set up a powerfully suggestive environment within which the 
potential for the generation of illusory memories is substantial. Can this type of situation be 
artificially simulated in the laboratory, and if so, will it contribute to increased reports of memories 
for events never experienced? In the current study, severed elements of memory recovery therapy 
were simulated in order to explore their potential to create £alse memories. Participants were 
exposed to a mildly traumatic event, were told by an authority figure that they had experienced 
some memory loss for the event, and were encouraged to work on recovering their memories for 
the alleged event using variations on techniques common to memory recovery therapies (i.e., 
imagining and writing about "forgotten" events). 
There were three major questions to be answered in this study: 1) Can combined exposure 
to a memory recovery theory and suggestive memory recovery techniques induce illusory 
memories for events that never occurred?; 2) Can simple exposure to a repression and recovery 
theory of memory lead to the generation of false memories for "forgotten" events?; and 3) In the 
absence of an explicit memory recovery theory, is the use of such memory recovery techniques as 
imagery and joumalling sufficient for false memories to be produced? 
The assumption underlying the first question is that a combmation of suggestive theory 
and suggestive techniques may act as a powerfiil motivator toward creating illusory memories for 
events that were never experienced (e.g., Lindsay & Read, 1994). Ihe primary hypothesis in this 
study is that theory and technique will interaa to produce false memories for unexperienced 
events. If such an interaction is found, it would be beneficial to look at the separate contributions 
of each factor to Oie creation of false memories. It is possible that theory or technique alone may 
be enough to encourage the formation and reporting of illusory memories. 
Hie second question assesses the power of suggestion in this type of situation. It asks 
whether mere exposure to a repression and recovery tiieory is enough to motivate the creation of 
illusory memories for events that never occurred. Previous laboratory research usuig a misleading 
post-event information paradigm supports the idea that suggestion alone may encourage false 
memory reports (e.g., Loftus, et al., 1978). Coming firom a credible source, the suggestion that one 
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may be repressing a memory may begin to seem likely, and may eventually lead to £alse memory 
reports (Loftus & Ketcham, 1995). 
The third question focuses on technique. It asks whether rehearsal alone, in ttie form of 
imagining and writing about difBcult scenes, can lead people to experience enhanced memory and 
to produce false reports for scenes they did not view. Research on reality monitoring confusions 
has shown that rehearsal can increase the clarity and other aspects of imagined events (Suengas & 
Johnson, 1988). Repeated imagining may prove a powerful stimulus toward the creation of illusory 
memories. 
Study Overview 
Participants were exposed to a stressful event by watching a videot^ that included scenes 
of explicit and implicit aggressiveness and sexual violence perpetrated on women and children. It 
was then suggested to participants that they had seen certain scenes that in fact they had not. 
Therefore, it became apparent to participants that alfliough they remembered certain scenes firom 
the videot^ quite well (real scenes), they had evidently experienced some memory disruptions 
for other (fake) scenes. People in the experimental condition then saw a second videotape in which 
an actor portraying a clinical psychologist presented a theory of how memories for traumatic 
experiences can be repressed and subsequently recovered. Control subjects did not see this 
videotape. All participants were asked to mentally rehearse scenes that purportedly appeared in the 
violent videotape by engaging in imagery and joumalllng tasks (i.e., imagining and writing about 
the scenes) at various points over a 48-hour period. Participants described their memories for 
once-rehearsed and thrice-rehearsed real and fake scenes on Memory Characteristics Questionnaires 
(MCQs; adj^ted firom Johnson, et al., 1988). They also completed a questionnaire regarding how 
confident they were that each scene on a list of rehearsed and unrehearsed real and fake scenes 
had actually iq)peared in the violent videotiq)e, and a number of ancillary measures. The complete 
study design involved one between-subjects vari^le (memory theory) with two levels (control, 
repression), one within-subjects variable (scene type) with two levels (real, fake) and one 
within-subjects variable (rehearsal) with three levels (0,1, or 3 rehearsals). Table 1 illustrates this 
design. Hie primary dependent variables were mean MCQ scores and mean confidence estimates. 
Predictions 
Memory characteristics 
1) Memories for scenes that participants actually saw (real scenes) will be stronger than for 
scenes that participants did not see (fake scenes), as reflected in relatively higher MCQ scores. 
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Table 1 
Study Design and Target Scenes 
Memory Theory 
Control (n=24) Repression (^=24) 
Rehearsals Real Fake Real Fake 
3 abed efgh abed efgh 
! abed efgh abed efgh 
0 i-t u-x i-t u-x 
Note. Individual participants rehearsed only two of the four scenes listed in each cell. Real and 
fake scenes were yoked, and the order in which scenes were rehearsed was counterbalanced. For 
example, an individual participant who rehearsed real scenes a and b three times woidd also 
rehearse fake scenes e and/three times in one of four predetermined orders: aebf, a/be, beaf, or 
bfae. The same participant would rehearse scenes c, d, g, and h during the second session. 
2) As the number of rehearsals increases, so should the complexity of memory descriptions 
(e.g., Suengas & Johnson, 1988). Therefore, a main effect for rehearsals is expected such that 
MCQ scores will be higher for scenes rehearsed three times than for those rehearsed only once. 
3) Repeated rehearsal should lead to a greater increase in reported memory characteristics 
for fake scenes flian for real scenes. Real scenes should be recidled clearly after the first rehearsal. 
Additional rehearsals are unlikely to substantially improve one's memory for scenes about which 
there was little doubt in the first place. Memories for fake scenes, on the other hand, may be 
greatly enhanced by rehearsal. Research has shown that repeated rehearsals of imaginary events 
can result in reality monitoring errors (Suengas & Johnson, 1988). Rehearsing fake scenes three 
times should make memories for them much more vivid than rehearsing them only once. 
4) People who hear the repression theory will describe more complex event memories than 
people who hear no memory theory. Hie suggestion tiiat one may have repressed recoverable 
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memories in effect gives ftee reign to the imagination, and may result in increased reporting of 
memories (Lindsay & Read, 1994). 
5) Fake scenes will be described more vividly by participants in the repression condition 
than those in the control condition. Participants in the control condition would have no reason to 
report memories of which they are unsure (e.g., memories for £ake scenes). The repression theory 
gives permission to identify images as memories, and provides the motivation to report them. 
6) Repeated attempts to generate memories for fake scenes should enhance the tendency to 
report memories for such scenes, especially when one has been exposed to a repression and 
recovery theory. When repeated attempts to generate memories are made, people may begin to 
believe more strongly in the vsdidity of their memories if they have been given reason to do so 
than if they have not The repression theory px)vides a basis for recovering traumatic memories as 
well as a label for any images that are generated by subsequent rehearsals. People who have no 
such theory on which to rely may simply dismiss resultant images as random figments of the 
imagination rather than identifying them as reliable products of memory. 
Confidence 
1) People will be more confident in their memories for real scenes than for fake scenes. 
They will be mote confident that they actually saw the real scenes than the fake scenes. 
2) Participants in the repression condition should be more confident than control 
participants that fake scenes actually appeared in the violent videotape. The presentation of the 
repression theory by a credible source combined with support and encouragement from the 
experimenter may inaease people's confidence that there is something to be remembered, even if 
they are unable to recall anything fi:om those scenes. Repression-theory and control participants 
should be equally confident that they saw the real scenes from the violent videotape. 
3) The increased confidence, relative to control partidpants, that repression-condition 
participants place in their memories for M;e scenes should be enhanced by repeated rehearsals. 
Repeated attempts to imagine fake scenes should enhance memory characteristics for those scenes, 
as well as confidence that the scenes actually occurred. Even if participants are unable to recall 
"forgotten" scenes fiom the violent videotape after several attempts to imagine them, their 
confidence that they saw the scenes may still be affected by having heard a repression theory. 
People in the repression condition may be more likely than those in the control condition to 
believe that ttie memory is there, but temporarily unaccessible. Because scenes that actually 
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{^peared in the violent videotape should be well-iemembered by everyone from the start, rehearsal 
should not increase confidence in memory for real scenes. 
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METHOD 
Paitidpants 
Sixty-nine women recruited firom the undergraduate psychology pool at Iowa State 
University participated in individual sessions in which they were randomly assigned to one of the 
two between-subjects conditions (control or refn^ession). Participants in this study earned two 
extra-credit points to be ap[died toward course grades. People particularly sensitive to media 
violence were discouraged fiom signing up for this study, and the violent nature of the first 
videotape was explained to participants both orally and on a written consent form. Two women 
stopped the videot£  ^and did not complete the first session. Four other women failed to return for 
a second session. A total of 63 women completed both phases of the study. 
Stimulus Materials 
Violent videotape 
The videotape consisted of a series of 16 fast-paced scenes, gathered firom 13 different PG-
or R-rated Hollywood-produced films that depicted violence or abusive acts. Him clips were 
chosen to be somewhat analogous to the types of abusive incidents reported by clients in 
memory-recovery flier^ies. The t  ^included scenes of implied and actual sexual abuse, as well 
as verbsd and physical ^use of both women and children. The violent film clips were spliced 
together without any breaks. Individual scenes lasted between 15 and 49 s, and the completed tape 
lasted 8.6 minutes. 
Hie violent videot  ^was designed to induce negative affect in participants and to serve 
as a stimulus for later memory tests. There is support for the idea that watching media violence 
may be a powerflil way to elicit negative thoughts and emotions in viewers (e.g., Bushman & 
Geen, 1990). As a manipulation check of emotional reactivity to the stimulus tape, 22 women in a 
pilot study rated the violent videotape on six dimensions. The women indicated how exciting, 
suspenseful, amusing, stressful, frightening, and disturbing they perceived the videotape to be by 
marking 150 mm lines with endpoints labeled not at all and very. Except ratings of how amusing 
the videot  ^was (M = 28.8, SD = 28.9), average reactions on the emotional response dimensions 
fell at or above the scale midpoints. Means (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the 
remaining five dimensions were as follows: exciting, 75.1 (38.5); suspenseful, 95.1 (33.7); 
stressful, 112.3 (28.8); fiightening, 96.2 (40.9); and disturbing, 112.0 (30.2). These data show that 
the violent videotape is capable of eliciting negative emotional reactions in women. 
26 
Pilot testing of the violent video also gave a measure of the memorability of individual 
scenes. Eight female participants watched the conq)leted videotape and ranked the scenes in terms 
of how well they could remember them. Table 2 shows scene titles, length, and averaged ranks for 
the 16 violent scenes in the order that they appear in the videotape. 
T^le2 
Order, Length, and Memorability of Violent Videotape Scenes 
Scene TlUe Length (s) Memorability 
Ranking 
1. Women getting hair cut off (i) 27 2 
2. Woman beaten in front of mirror (j) 46 3 
3. Boys playing football (k) 15 14 
4. Woman trying to cook a TV dinner 0) 49 4 
5. Woman with candle in dark house (c) 37 15 
6. Man shoves jar into boy's face (m) 27 7 
7. Woman pouring beer into sink (n) 32 6 
8. House being robbed (a) 20 16 
9. Train crashes into truck (o) 40 11 
10. Woman shot in chest (p) 27 5 
11. Tennis player being stalked (q) 42 8 
12. Man and boys fishing (r) 22 9 
13. Boy locked in closet (b) 38 12 
14. Boy stabbing woman in bed (s) 27 10 
IS. Man and woman fighting on boat (d) 23 13 
16. Women fighting in attic (t) 49 1 
Note. Letters in parentheses correspond to scene labels in Table 1. Scenes #5, 8,13, and 15 (a-d) 
were chosen as target scenes for the imagery and joumalling tasks based on memor^ility and 
scene length. 
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Memory theory videotape 
This videotape served as a manipulatioii of participants' exposure to a theory of memory 
repression and recovery. Participants were told diat die study was designed to test certain 
techniques that were commonly used in therapy to retrieve hidden memories. The videotape would 
explain both the theory behind memory recovery and how the specific techniques to be tested in 
the study were being used in psychotherapy. This videotape depicted an interview with an 
experienced clinical psychologist who described a theory of how traumatic memories may be 
repressed and subsequently recovered. The videotaped segment included persuasive case examples 
demonstrating the successfid use of imagery (imagining forgotten events) and joumalling (writing 
about imagined events) to recover rei^essed memories. 
Two non-professional actors portrayed the interviewer and psychologist In accordance 
with the principles of persuasion (Petty & Caccioppo, 1986), the psychologist was portrayed as a 
competent, credible source, possessing impressive aedentials (e.g., a Hi.D. in psychology and 20 
years of research experience with himian memory) and speaking confidently about his beliefs and 
practices. The psychologist's discussion of the repression and recovery theory was imbedded in an 
interview about his general practice, and was supported with a case description highlighting the 
effectiveness of certain techniques (i.e., imagery and joumalling) to reliably elicit hidden traumatic 
memories. The psychologist's statements were based on beliefs commonly held by 
memory-recovery therapists, and the case description was based on recent reports of 
therapy-assisted traumatic-memory recovery (see Loitus & Ketcham, 1994). Three crucial points 
were made in the psychologist's presentation; that it is common for memories of traumatic or 
affect-laden events to be at least temporarily disrupted, that memories for such events may later be 
recovered, and that certain techniques have been shown to be successfiil at prompting memory 
recovery in the context of psychotherapy. The psychologist also provided a link to participants' 
apparent memory deficits for scenes from the violent videot  ^by noting that it is common to 
experience recession for events associated with anxiety, even if the events don't seem traxmiatic at 
the time. The script for this videotape spears in Appendix A. 
Imagery materials 
ShorOy after viewing the violent videotq)e, participants completed one of two ranking lists 
comprised of eight scenes that ostensibly appeared in the video. Target scenes on these lists were 
used as stimuli for subsequent imagery and joumalling tasks (i.e., rehearsal). Hie ranking lists 
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included six scenes that appeared in the violent videotape (real scenes) and two scenes that did not 
appear (fake scenes). 
To generate two comparable ranking lists for the main study, a median split was used to 
divide the ranked list of scenes from the pilot study (see Table 2) into high and low-memorability 
categories. The goal of the ranking and rehearsal procedures in the main study was to provide 
participants with an experience of relatively diminished memory for several scenes. Thus, four of 
the lowest-ranked scenes (memorability rankings 12,13,15, and 16) were chosen a priori as target 
scenes for rehearsal. These four scenes were matched for memorability and length, paired, and 
counterbalanced across the two ranking lists. Scenes ranked 5-8 (relatively memorable scenes) 
were chosen to ^pear on both ranking lists as fillers. Finally, fake scene titles were generated to 
fit the general theme of the scenes that actually appeared in the violent videotape (i.e., abuse 
against women and children). These fisike scene titles were matched for relative similarity and 
distributed across the two lists (e.g., each list contained a fake scene title referring to an interaction 
between a father and daughter that could be interpreted as sexual in nature). The resulting ranking 
lists contained the same four teal (filler) scenes, two matched real (target) scenes, and two matched 
fake (target) scenes. The final ranking lists a[q)ear in .Aj^ndix B. 
Dependent Measures 
The Memory Characteristics Questionnaire 
The 39-item Memory Characteristics (^estionnaire (MCC  ^ developed by Johnson et al. 
(1988) was modified for use as the i^imary dependent measure. Hie MCQ provides a sensitive 
measure of differences in memory quality between real and imaginary events (Suengas & Johnson, 
1988). Items involving qualities that were not characteristic of the events depicted in the violent 
videotape (e.g., an interpretable story line, whether the mood was positive or negative), that were 
not possible to glean from the videot^d events (e.g., the date or hour at which the events took 
place), or that did not ^ ly to events e}q>erienced vicariously ttirough flie medium of videotape 
(e.g., smell, touch, or taste associated with the events) were omitted from the revised 
questionnaire. The remaining 18 items assessed clarity and vividness of memory for the events, 
memory for spatial and temporal qualities of the events, valence and strength of affective reactions 
to the events, amoimt of event rehearsal, and confidence in event memories. Two additional items 
were included on MCQs administered during the second session to assess how often participants 
had talked or thought about the videotape between sessions. All responses were made on 7-point 
scales. The revised MCQ s^ars in Appendix C. 
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Confidence measure 
Participants rated bow confident they were Aat various scenes appeared in the violent 
videotape using a 7-point scale that ranged from not at all confident to completely confident Hie 
confidence rating list included the titles of sdl 16 real scenes that had appeared in the violent 
videotape (4 rehearsed and 12 unrehearsed), as well as tiie names of 8 fiake scenes (4 rehearsed 
and 4 unrehearsed). Scene titles were listed in random order (Appendix D). 
Manipulation checks and ancillary measures 
Manipulation checks on memory theory, amount of rehearsal, and participants' beliefs were 
imbedded as items on a final set of questionnaires (Af^ndix E). In both recsQl (free response) and 
recognition (multiple choice) format, participants were asked to reiterate what the expert in the 
videotape concluded about traumatic memories generated with memory recovery techniques. Their 
personal beliefis about such recovered memories were assessed in a separate question. Participants 
were also asked to indicate how much time they spent on tiie take-home rehearsal task and at what 
time they completed the task to assess whether they had followed instructions. Finally, they 
completed a number of additional items regarding their familiarity with the violent film clips, and 
provided demographic infonnatioa 
Procedure 
Session 1 
Participants were told that the goal of the study was to assess women's reactions to media 
violence. Participants were informed orally and in writing that they would be asked to watch a 
videotape containing violent scenes depicting human injury and suffering, bleeding wounds, and 
partial nudity. After giving written consent, participants watched the violent videots .^ Following 
the videotape, they were asked about their overall reactions to the t  ^on a short 
emotional-response measure. Participants indicated on ISO-mm lines how exciting, suspensefiil, 
amusing, stressftd, frightening, and disturbing ttiey found the videotape. 
After completing the emotional-response measure, participants were given one of two 
ranking lists. Participants were asked to rank-order eight scenes that "people in previous studies 
had the most trouble remembering" according to how well they could recall the clips. To ensure 
similar interpretation of this instruction, participants were told that their response should be based 
on the ease with which they could mentally reconstrua each scene from beginning to end. The 
scene they remembered the best should be assigned a rank of 1, the scene they remembered the 
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least a rank of 8, and all other scenes an ordered rank in between. Participants were not told that 
the list included scenes that had not actually appeared on the videotape (i.e., fake scenes). 
After completing the ranking task, participants were told tiiat memory for events associated 
with fear or anxiety is sometimes disrupted, and that any difficulty they were having remembering 
particular scenes was completely normal. The experimenter explained that the experiment was 
designed to test the usefulness of certain techniques for improving memory for disturbing or 
stressful experiences. 
The experimenter next gave instructions for the guided imagery task. Participants were 
asked to close their eyes and attempt to visualize four scenes "as if you were watching (them) on 
the videota  ^again" for two minutes each. Two real and two fake target scenes that appeared on 
the participant's ranking list had been preselected for ttiis task, and were imagined in a 
counterbalanced order such that a real scene was always followed by a fake scene. Participants 
were asked to generate a mental image of the first (real) scene, focusing on both perceptual and 
apperceptual characteristics of the scene (i.e., what they remembered seeing, hearing, thinking, and 
feeling while watching the scene). After two minutes, participants completed a Memory 
Characteristics Questionnaire (MC(  ^describing their memories for the scene. They then repeated 
the imagery and MCQ procedure for the three remaining scenes. This procedure generated Time 1 
MCQ1-MC(34 for each participant 
The experimenter again briefly discussed with participants their sqpparent lack of memory 
for certain portions of the videotape (i.e., the fake scenes). Participants were reminded that it is not 
uncommon to experience some memory failure when exposed to stressful or disturbing events. At 
this point, participants in the experimental (repression) condition viewed the second videotape. The 
memory-theory videot  ^was introduced by the experimenter as an example of how an imagery 
technique similar to the one used in the study has been used in the real world. In the videotape, a 
psychologist explained the theory of memory repression and recovery, and presented a case smdy 
as an illustration of how he had successfiilly used imagery and joumalUng techniques to help 
people recover hidden memories for traumatic experiences. Following this viewing, participants 
were told that the theory and techniques presented by the psychologist in the videotape needed 
further testing. The experimenter explained that the study was designed to test whether imagery 
and joumalling are capable of improving memory for stressful events. 
All participants were given verbal and written instructions for die take-home imagery and 
joumsdling task. They were asked to repeat the imagery task on the same four scenes, in the same 
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order, at q)proxiiDately the same time the next day. As a reminder, the experimenter listed the four 
scenes to be imagined on an instruction sheet in the order in which they were imagined during the 
first session. Imagery and joumalling instructions fa the take-home task appear in Appendix F. 
Participants recorded firee narratives on the take-home joumalling task in small notebooks marked 
only with an identification number for matching. 
Session 2 
Participants were asked to turn in their blue-book journals. The experimenter reiterated that 
the study was concerned with testing the effects of imagery and joumalling on memory. 
Participants were asked to engage in a final round of imagery and to fill out a second set of 
Memory Characteristics Questionnaires for the same four scenes that they had imagined on the two 
previous days. When this task was completed, participants were asked to imagine four additional 
scenes (two real and two fake) and to fill out corresponding MCQs, for comparison purposes. 
These four matched, preselected scenes i^ipeared on the ranking list that the participant did not 
receive in the first session. Thus a totsd of eight scenes were imagined during the second session; 
four that had been imagined during the first session and at home, and four they had not previously 
imagined nor seen on the list of ranked scenes. Thus, the final imagery task and eight MCQs were 
completed for two previously-rehearsed real scenes, two previously-rehearsed fake scenes (a total 
of three rehearsals apiece), and for two previously unrehearsed real scenes and two previously 
unrehearsed fake scenes (a total of one rehearsal £q>iece). This procedure generated Time 2 MCQl-
MCQ8 for each participant 
The eight preselected low-memorability scenes (4 real and 4 fake) were always used in the 
imagery and joumalling tasks, in counterbalanced order. Referring back to Table 1, the letters a, b, 
c, and d denote real scenes, whereas the letters e,f, g, and h denote fake scenes. Participants who 
received List 1 rehearsed scenes a, b, e, and /three times in one of four orders: aebf, a/be, beaf, or 
bfae. They rehearsed scenes c, d, g, and h once in one of four orders; cgdh, chdg, dgch, or dhcg. 
For participants who received List 2, the number of rehearsals on the two sets of scenes was 
reversed, but the orders retained the same counterbalancing scheme (e.g., a participant who 
rehearsed ordered scenes cgdh three times would rehearse scenes aebf once). 
After completing the last MCQ, participants filled out a final set of questionnaires that 
included manipulation checks, general questions regarding their participation in the study, and the 
confidence measure. 
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Finally, each participant was fully debriefed. Hie experimenter briefly summarized the 
goals of the study and the methods that were used to encourage formation of illusory memories, 
including how names of scenes that did not actually appear in the violent videotqie were 
imbedded on the ranking and imagery tasks. The experimenter explained to participants that one 
goal of the study was to see if people are susceptible to misleading suggestions of this type, and 
assured them tiiat responding to such suggestions was perfectly normal. Every effort was made to 
ensure that people left die laboratory feeling positively about their participation in the study, with 
a sense of the importance of the research and their contribution to it The fiill script for the study 
£^pears in Appendix G. Hiis research was approved by the Iowa State University Human Subjects 
Review Committee. 
Subsample Used for Analyses 
Of the 63 women who completed the study, three women left substantial missing values on 
key dependent measures (i.e.. Memory Characteristics Questionnaires). Discarding data from these 
three participants resulted in unequal between-subjects cell sizes, and disrupted the 
counterbalancing scheme within cells. Potential effects of the order in which scenes were imagined 
made equalizing the counterbalancing within cells desirable. To accomplish this, data from an 
additional 12 participants were excluded from analyses. These 12 participants were randomly 
selected within cells from those with missing data on varii^les of lesser importance (i.e., questions 
on ancillary measures). Analyses were thus conducted on data from 48 participants, 24 in each 
between-subjects condition. According to standard power tables (Cohen, 1988), 24 people per cell 
allows detection of a standardized mean difference of 0.80 (a large effect) with power=.77 and a 
two-sided alpha level of .05. 
Of the 48 participants included for analyses, 42 were White (87.5%), 2 were Black (4.2%), 
2 were Asian (4.2%), and 2 were Hispanic/Latina (4.2%). Most were native English-speakers 
(93.8%), but three were not (6.2%). Ages ranged from 18 to 23 (Af = 19.1, SD = 1.1 years). 
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RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
Participants were asked in a multiple-choice question what the videotaped psychologist 
concluded about "the effects of stress on memory and the way the mind works." TwenQr-three of 
the 24 control participants (95.8%) accurately responded that they did not see a videotaped 
psychologist Of the 24 people who did view the second tiq)e, 23 (95.8%) accurately identified 
what the psychologist had discussed regarding memory repression (i.e., ttiat "the mind will 
sometimes completely block out memories of events that occurred under stressful conditions"), but 
only 14 (58%) correctly identified what he had said about memory recovery (i.e., that "accurate 
and complete memories can be recovered later, after the stress has passed"). Nine people believed 
the psychologist had said that "^though some true memories may be recovered after the stress has 
passed, some false information will also be recovered." One person in ttie repression condition 
erroneously recsdled the psychologist having concluded that repression of stressful memories is 
unlikely, and that any recovered memories are likely to be false. 
To verify that all participants rehearsed four target scenes a total of three limes during the 
experiment, it was important to determine whether they had diligently completed the take-home 
imagery and joumalling task, and to identify any differences between people in the control and 
repression conditions. All participants returned their journals to the experimenter at the beginning 
of their second session. No one returned an inconq)lete journal - all had made entries for each of 
the target scenes they had been asked to imagine. Participants were asked to report what day and 
at what time they had completed the take-home imagery and joumalling task. Responses were 
coded to reflect the amount of time that had passed between the beginning of the first session and 
the time at which tiiey reported having completed the take-home task. All 48 participants reported 
having completed the task prior to returning for their second session, M time = 38.9 hours. 
Although it appeared as though people in the repression condition completed Oie take-home task 
somewhat later than people in the control condition, the time difference was not statistically 
significant, Ms = 42.7 and 35.1 hours, 5Ds = 26.7 and 21.9, respectively, r(46) = -1.08, p = .28, d 
- 0.32. Participants were also asked to report the amount of time they had spent on the take-home 
imagery and joumalling task. Again, there were no differences between people in the repression 
and control conditions in the time spent on the take-home task, Ms = 17.4 and 18.5 minutes, 5Ds 
= 9.4 and 8.0, respectively, r(46) = .45, p - .66, d = 0.13. Thus, all participants appear to have 
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complied with the experimenter's request to rehearse the four scenes a second time before 
returning to the laboratory. 
Memory Characteristics 
Overall memory for the eight scenes rehearsed during Session 2 was assessed by 
calculating total scores on each participants Memory Characteristics Questionnaires. Responses on 
items 1-18 were summed to produce total MCQ scores that could range &om 18-126. Higher MCQ 
scores reflect better memory for a scene. 
A 2 X 2 X 4 analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted separately on total MCQ scores 
for each of the eight scenes rehearsed during Session 2 (Time 2 MCQ1-MCQ8) to test for 
differences between these scenes, and for potential effects of the order in which scenes were 
rehearsed. Hiis design reflects the two-level between-subjects factor memory theory (control vs. 
repression); the two-level between-subjects factor list (1, 2); and the four-level between-subjects 
factor order (aeb£^cgdh, afbe/chdg, beafi'dgch, bfae/dhcg). No significant effects of these variables 
were found for any of the rehearsed real scenes. A list effect was found for fake scenes that were 
rehearsed three times (MCQ2 and MC(24), F(l, 32) = 11.64, p < .005, d = 1.21 for MCQ2, and 
F(l, 32) = 5.87, p < .05, d = 0.86 for MC(J4, respectively. Participants reported stronger memories 
for fake scenes that appeared on List 2 (Woman shoots her attacker; Father molesting daughter) 
than they did for fake scenes that ^>peared on List 1 (Man throwing furniture during fight; Father 
tearing at daughter's clodies). For MCQ2, List 2M = 45.8 {SD = 25.1) and List I M = 28.5 {SD = 
9.4); and for MC(J4, List 2 A/ = 42.1 (SD = 23.5), and Ust 1 Af = 29.2 (SD = 10.0). Apparenfly 
the fake scene titles on List 2 led participants to generate more detailed memories than did those 
on List 1. Because these list effects did not interact with memory theory or order, and because list 
and order were countetbsdanced within memory-theory condition, the effects of list and order were 
not further analyzed. 
The remaining analyses were conducted on mean MCQ scores, which were calculated 
across items 1-18 for each of the four scenes imagined during Session 1 (Time 1 MCQ1-MCQ4) 
and for each of the eight scenes imagined during Session 2 (Time 2 MCQ1-MCQ8). Higher mean 
scores indicate more detailed memories for the scene. It was desirable to make two kinds of 
comparisons: between-subjects, comparing the same scenes rehearsed once versus three times (at 
Time 2); and within-subjects, comparing the first and ttiird rehearsal of the same scenes (at Time 1 
and Time 2, respectively). Thus, a 2 (Memory Theory) x 2 (Scene Type) x 3 (Rehearsal) ANOVA 
was conducted to test for mean differences on MCQ scores. The three levels of rehearsal refer to 
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the first rehearsal Cllffle 1) of scenes rehearsed multiple times, the first rehearsal of scenes 
rehearsed only once (Time 2), and the third rehearsal of scenes rehearsed multiple times (Time 2). 
Results of this analysis appear in Table 3. A fiill table of means and standard deviations for this 
analysis is reported in Appendix H. 
Table 3 
Full Design Analysis of Variance for Memory Characteristics Questionnaire Means 
Source df SS F 
Between subjects 
Theory 1 0.28 0.16 .003 
Subject within-group error 46 80.94 (1.76) 
Within subjects 
Scene type (S) 1 285.96 160.91* .778 
Theory x Scene 1 0.07 0.04 .001 
Scene x Subject within-group error 46 81.75 (1.78) 
Rehearsal (R) 2 13.17 22.86* .332 
Theory x Rehearsal 2 0.09 0.16 .003 
Rehears  ^x Subject within-group error 92 26.50 (0.29) 
Scene x Rehearsal 2 17.04 22.53* .329 
Theory x Scene x Rehearsal 2 1.82 2.41 .050 
S X R X Subject within-group error 92 34.80 (0.38) 
Note. Values in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
'p < .0005 
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People in the leptession condition were expected to report enhanced memories for the 
violent scenes, compared to people in the control conditioa This difference was expected to be 
especially apparent for fake scenes, especially after repeated rehearsals of those scenes. There 
were, however, no significant effects for the between-subjects variable of memory theory. 
Exposure to a repression flieory of memory did not affect people's memory for either real or fake 
scenes under any rehearsal condition. Significant main effects were found for the wittun-subjects 
variables of scene type and rehearsal, which also interacted with each other to influence MCQ 
scores. In order to better assess the nature of the within-subjects effects, a 2 (Scene Type) x 3 
(Rehearsal) ANOVA with planned orthogonal contrasts was performed, excluding flie 
between-subjects variable, memory theory. Results of this andysis are reported in Table 4. In both 
analyses, the Mauchly sphericity test revealed a problem with the variable rehearsal. Therefore, 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom are reported in flie text for all rehearsal effects. 
As predicted, real scenes were described in greater detail as measured by mean MCQ 
scores than were fake scenes, F(l, 47) = 164.26, p < .0005, d = 3.74; Ms = 4.14 and 2.14, 
respectively. There was also a main effect for rehearsal, F(1.7, 79) = 23.28, p < .0005. Planned 
orthogonsd contrasts reve^ded two significant differences, only partly confirming prediction 2. As 
predicted, the same scenes were recalled better by people who had rehearsed them three times over 
the two-day period than by people who rehearsed them only once (during Session 2), F(l, 47) = 
23.17, p < .0005, d = 1.40; Ms = 3.24 and 2.85, respectively. People tended to show a decrease in 
memory for scenes that were repeatedly rehearsed F(l, 47) = 32.25, p < .0005, d = 1.66. People 
remembered scenes better after the fkst rehearsal during Session 1 than after the third rehearsal 
during Session 2, Ms = 3.34 and 3.24, respectively. These effects are clarified by a significant 
Scene Type x Rehearsal interaction, ^(1.7,79) = 21.88, p < .0005. 
Planned orthogonal contrasts again reveled two significant effects. The first significant 
interaction was between scene type and rehearsals at Time 2, F(l, 47) = 28.24, p < .0005, d = 
1.55. Real scenes were recced better by people who had rehearsed them three times than by 
people who rehearsed them only once during the second session, Ms = 4.45 and 3.50, respectively, 
but there was no difference in memory reported during Session 2 for fake scenes rehearsed three 
times versus only once, Ms = 2.02 and 2.19, respectively. The second significant interaction was 
for scene type by session, F(l, 47) = 25.49, p < .(X)05, d = 1.47. There was no improvement in 
memory for real scenes after repeated rehearsals (i.e., from the first to the third rehearsal, Ms = 
4.46 and 4.45, respectively), and there was a slight decrement in memory for fake scenes from the 
37 
Table 4 
Within-subjects Analysis of Variance for MCQ Means with Special Contrasts 
Source df SS F 
Scene type (S) 1 285.96 164.26* .778 
Scene x Subject within-group error 47 81.82 (1.74) 
Rehearsal (R) 2 13.17 23.28* .331 
Rehearsal x Subject wifliin-group error 94 26.59 (0.28) 
Univariate contrasts; 
Reh (1.3) 1 7.29 23.17 .330 
Contrast within-group error 47 (0.31) 
Time (1.2) 1 11.90 32.25* .407 
Contrast within-group error 47 (0.37) 
Scene Type x Rehearsal 2 17.04 21.88* .318 
S X R X Subject within-group error 94 36.62 (0.39) 
Interaction univariate contrasts: 
Scene x Reh (1,3) 1 14.83 28.24* .375 
Contrast within-group error 47 (0.53) 
Scene x Time (1.2) 1 10.33 25.49* .352 
Contrast within-group error 47 (0.41) 
Note. Values in parentheses represent mean square errors. Reh = Rehearsal effect (1 
vs. 3 rehearsals measured at Time 2); Hme = Hme effect (1 vs. 3 rehearsals 
measured at Time 1 and Hme 2, respectively). 
*p < .0005 
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first to the third rehearsal, Ms = 2.22 and 2.02, respectively. Means and standard deviations for 
this set of analyses appear in Table S. 
Although no significant effects for memory theory were found in the overall analysis of 
MCQ mean scores, it is possible that the memory-theory manipulation may have differentially 
affected responses on individual MCQ items. Therefore, an exploratory 2 (Memory Theory) x 2 
(Scene Type) x 3 (Rehearsal) analysis of variance was performed on each of the 18 MCQ items to 
assess potential effects of the memory-theory manipulation that may have been masked in the 
initial analysis of mean MCQ scores. Individual item analyses revealed die same pattern of effects 
as the analysis of mean MCQ scores. Although main effects of scene type and rehearsal and an 
interaction between the scene-type and rehearsal variables were found for nearly every MCQ item, 
Table 5 
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) Means 
Rehearsals 
Scene Type 
Time 1 Time 2 
1 1 3 
Real 
M 4.46* 3.50" 4.45' 
SD 0.79 0.94 0.84 
Fake 
M 2.22* 2.19^" 2.02" 
SD 0.96 0.96 0.87 
Note. Means within a row that have different superscripts are 
significantly different at p < .OS. 
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no main effects or interactions were found for the memory-theory manipulation (all ps > .10). 
A complete table of means and standard deviations for the individual MCQ items appears in 
Appendix J. 
Confidence 
At the end of the second session, participants rated how confident they were that each of 
16 real and 8 fake scenes appeared in the violent videotape. Mean confidence was calculated 
separately for 12 unrehearsed teal scenes, 4 unrehearsed fake scenes, 4 rehearsed teal scenes, and 4 
rehearsed fake scenes. Each participant contributed multiple data points to the confidence analysis. 
A 2 (Memory Hieory) x 2 (Scene Type) x 3 (Rehears^) ANOVA was performed on mean 
confidence scores. The three levels of rehearsal for this analysis were 0,1, and 3. Results appear 
in Table 6. A fuU table of means and standard deviations conesponding to this analysis appears in 
Appendix I. 
People who heard the repiession-and-recovety theory of memory were expected to be more 
confident that they had witnessed the fake scenes than people who had not heard such a theory. 
This elfea was expected to be enhanced by repeated attempts to recall the fake scenes. These 
predictions were disconfirmed. As with MCQ scores, fliere was no main effect of memory theory 
on confidence, nor did memory theory interact with any other variable to influence confidence 
ratings. There were, however, significant main effects and interactions of the within-subjects 
variables of scene type and rehearsal on confidence ratings. To clarify these results, a 2 (Scene 
Type) X 3 (Rehearsal) within-subjects ANOVA with planned orthogonal contrasts was performed 
on mean confidence ratings. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7. Corresponding 
means are reported in Table 8. 
As predicted, there was a significant main effect of scene type on confidence, F(l, 47) = 
301.39, p < .0005, d - 5.06. People were more confident that they had actually witnessed the real 
scenes than the fake scenes, Ms = 5.99 and 2.22, respectively. There was also a significant main 
effect for rehearsal, F(2,94) = 12.57, p < .0005. Orthogonal univariate contrasts aided the 
interpretation of this effect 
The first contrast examined the effect of rehearsing scenes on confidence. People were 
more confident that they had seen scenes they had rehearsed (1 or 3 rehearsals) than scenes they 
had not rehearsed (0 rehearsals), F(l, 47) = 11.70, p < .005, d = 1.00; Ms = 4.26 and 3.80, 
respectively. The second contrast revealed that the number of rehearsals was also important. People 
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Tabled 
Full Design Analysis of Variance for Confidence Measures 
Source df SS F r\' 
Between subjects 
Theory 1 0.14 0.07 .002 
Subject within-group error 46 92.07 (2.00) 
Within subjects 
Scene type (S) 1 1023.47 296.54  ^ .866 
Theory x Scene 1 0.84 0.24 .005 
Scene x Subject within-group error 46 158.76 (3.45) 
Rehearsal (R) 2 28.00 12.40* .212 
Theory x Rehearsal 2 0.81 0.36 .008 
Rehearsal x Subject within-group error 92 103.87 (1.13) 
Scene x Rehearsal 2 29.80 20.78* .311 
Theory x Scene x Rehearsal 2 0.08 0.06 .001 
S X R X Subject within-group error 92 65.97 (0J2) 
Note. Values in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
'p < .0005 
were more confident they had viewed scenes rehearsed three times than those rehearsed only once, 
F(l, 47) = 13.54, p < .005, d = 1.07; Ms = 4.53 and 3.80, respectively. 
The Scene Type x Rehearsal interaction was also significant, F(2, 94) = 21.20, p < .0005. 
To aid interpretation of this interaction, nonorthogonal univariate contrasts on mean confidence 
scores were conducted separately for real and fake scenes. People were more confident ifaey had 
seen real scenes tiiat were rehearsed three times than real scenes that were only rehearsed once. 
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Table? 
Withiri'subjects Analysis of Variance for Confidence with Special Contrasts 
Source df SS F 
Scene type (S) 1 1023.47 301.39»» .865 
Scene x Subject within-group enor 47 159.60 (3.40) 
Rehearsal (R) 2 28.00 12.57** .211 
Rehearsal x Subject within-group error 94 104.68 (1.11) 
Univariate contrasts: 
Reh (0 vs. 1, 3) 1 13.65 11.70* .199 
Contrast within-group error 47 (1.17) 
Reh (1 vs. 3) 1 14.36 13.54* .224 
Contrast within-group error 47 (1.06) 
Scene Type x Rehearsal 2 29.80 21.20** .311 
S X R X Subject within-group error 94 66.05 (0.70) 
Note. Values in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
*p < .01 
**p < .0005 
F(l, 47) = 36.47, p < .0005, d = 1.76, or that were not rehearsed at all, F(l, 47) = 41.92, p < 
.0005, Ms = 6.73,5.43, and 5.81, respectively. The means for reid scenes rehearsed once and 
unrehearsed real scenes did not significantly differ, F(l,47) = 3.92, p = .05, d = .58. In other 
words, multiple rehearsals served to boost people's confidence that they had seen real scenes. 
In contrast, people were more confident that they had seen rehearsed than unrehearsed fake 
scenes, regardless of the number of rehearsals. Nonorthogonal univariate contrasts showed that 
people were more confident they had seen fake scenes rehearsed either once or three times than 
fake scenes that they had never rehearsed, F(l, 47) = 12.74, p < .005, d = 1.04 for one versus zero 
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Table 8 
Mean Confidence by Scene Type and Number of Rehearsals 
Rehearsals 
Scene Type 0 1 3 
Real 
M 5.81* 5.43* 6.73" 
SD 0.75 1.47 0.62 
n 12 2 2 
Fake 
M 1.78* 2.54" 2.33" 
SD 0.86 1.64 1.56 
n 4 2 2 
Note. Means widiin a row that have different superscripts are 
significantly different at />< .05. 
rehearsals; F(l, 47) = 6.52, p < .05, d = 0.74 for three versus zero rehearsals; Ms = 2.33, 2.54, and 
1.78 for 3 rehearsals, 1 rehearsal, and 0 rehearsals, respectively. The means for fate scenes 
rehearsed once versus three times did not differ, F(l,47) = 1.41, p = 0.24, d = 0.35. Urns, the 
number of rehearsals was an important influence on people's confidence that they had seen real 
scenes, whereas the mere act of rehearsal impacted people's confidence that they had seen fake 
scenes. 
Correlations 
Hearing a repression-and-recovery theory of memory did not affect people's confidence 
that they had seen fake scenes, nor did it affect their tendency to report memories for such scenes. 
Regardless of whether or not they were exposed to a repression theory during the study, it is 
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possible that people's personal beliefs legaiding the likelihood of repression and subsequent 
recovery of stressM memories may be related to ttieir confidence and willingness to report such 
memories. Participants were asked near the end of the study to report their personal beliefs 
regarding repression and the potential for memory recovery. Responses reflected one of three sets 
of beliefs; that repression is unlikely, and therefore any memories recovered are likely to be false; 
that repression is possible, but that both true and false memories are likely to be recovered; or that 
repression is possible, and accurate and complete memories are likely to be recovered. This 
repression-and-recovery beliefs variable was dummy coded and ordered such that higher scores 
reflect stronger beliefs in the possibility of repressing and s'jbsequently recovering accurate 
memories for traumatic events. Repression beliefs were Qien correlated with MCQ scores and 
confidence for both rehearsed and unrehearsed real and fake scenes (see Table 9). 
Table 9 
Correlations Between Participant Beliefs, Confidence, and Memory Characteristics 
Questionnaire (MCQ) Scores 
Scene Type 
Confidence for Confidence for 
Belief MCQ Rehearsed Scenes Unrehearsed Scenes 
Real 
Belief 
MCQ 
Confidence -
0.25 -0.04 
0.38»* 
0.10 
0.31* 
0.36* 
Rehearsed 
Fake 
Belief 
MCQ 
Confidence 
0.28 0.29* 
0.69** 
0.37** 
0.51** 
0.43** 
Rehearsed 
*p<.05. •*p<.01. 
Although the correlations between repression beliefs and MCQ scores were not significant 
at the p = .05 level, people who held stronger beliefs in the possibility of memory repression and 
recovery did show a tendency toward increased reporting of memories for both real and fake 
scenes, rs = 0.25 and 0.28, respectively. Repression beliefs were not associated with confidence in 
having witnessed real scenes from (he violent videot ,^ but they were associated with confidence 
in having witnessed fake scenes. People who believed more strongly in the idea that stressful 
memories might be repressed and later recovered reported increased confidence that fake scenes 
(scenes they had not actually witnessed) had appeared in the violent videotape, rs = 0.29 and 0.37 
for rehearsed and unrehearsed fake scenes, respectively. The correlations between repression 
beliefs and confidence for real scenes were not significant at the p = .05 level, rs = -0.04 and 0.10 
for rehearsed and imrehearsed real scenes, respectively. 
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DISCUSSION 
Memory Characteristics 
This experiment tested the effects of exposure to a lepression-and-recovery theory of 
memory and of leheaisal on memories for traumatic events. Hearing a repression ttieory had no 
effect on people's memories for traumatic events, nor did it facilitate the creation of false 
memories for events they did not witness, even when the suggestive theory was combined with 
suggestive memory recovery techniques. Thus, the answer to two of the major questions in this 
study must be "no". Mere exposure to a repression theory of memory did not stimulate the creation 
of false memories, nor did the combination of theory and technique. The answer to the third 
question, regarding whether or not suggestive techniques alone can encourage the creation of false 
memories, also appears to be "no," at least in tiiis study. Multiple rehearsals did not enhance 
memory for events that never occurred. In fact, reported memory for repeatedly rehearsed fake 
scenes was somewhat lower after the third rehears  ^than after the first. Hie fact that people 
reported equally poor memories for fake scenes rehearsed several times over the 48-hour period 
following the videotape as they did for fake scenes that they had rehearsed only once after a two-
day delay also supports the conclusion that rehears  ^was not instrument  ^to inaeasing the 
perceived memorability of fake scenes. 
Events that were actually witnessed (real scenes) were recalled relatively well following a 
single rehearsal, so it is not altogether surprising tiiat repeated rehearsals did not further enhance 
memories for such scenes. However, real scenes were more memorable when rehearsed 
inunediately and repeatedly over a two-day period than when rehearsed for the first time following 
a two-day delay. In other words, the natural decline over time in memory for scenes that were 
actually witnessed was offset by rehearsing those scenes. Although increased rehearsals did not 
substantially improve memory for real scenes, this procedure was effective at keeping them in 
memory for a longer period of time than they would otherwise have been. 
Why was hearing a repression-and-recovery theory of memory ineffective at stimulating 
the "recovery" of traumatic event memories? There are several possible explanations. First, 
participants may not have been convinced by the videotaped psychologist's message regarding the 
possibility of repressing and subsequentiy recovering traumatic event memories. Results indicated 
tiiat this was possible. Participants in the repression-theory condition rated the videotaped 
psychologist's competence, the believability of a recovered-memory case study he had discussed, 
and the convincingness of his presentation on 7-point sc£des ranging from not at all to very 
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competent, believable, and convincing, respectively (see Reactions to videotaped psychologist 
measures, Appendix E). Although all but two people rated the psychologist at or above the 
midpoint of the competence sc^e (91.6%), participants rated the videotaped psychologist as being 
only moderately competent, on average, M = S.CX) (SD - 1.10). Participants also reported only 
moderately strong beliefs in the psychologist's story of a "woman he saw" (i.e., had treated) who 
had recovered repressed memories, M - 4.83 {SD = 1.46). Finally, participants reported that they 
were only somewhat convinced by the expert's presentation, M - 4.50 {SD = 1.47). Nineteen 
people (79.2%) rated the expert at or above the scale midpoint on the believabHity and 
convincingness items. These results suggest that the videotaped psychologist's presentation was 
only moderately convincing overall, and could certainly use some improvement 
Another possible explanation for the failure of the theory manipulation is that participants 
may not have accurately perceived the videotq)ed psyciiologist's message. A second possible 
explanation for why the theory manipulation was not effective is that participants may have 
forgotten or incorrectly understood the videotaped psychologist's conclusions regarding the 
possibility of recovering repressed, or temporarily forgotten, memories. This appears to be the 
case. Recall that, although nearly everyone in the repression condition correctly interpreted the 
expert's message regarding repression (i.e., that it is possible), only 58% of participants in that 
condition were able to accurately identify what he had said about the possibility of memory 
recovery (i.e., that trae memories, exclusively, were likely to be recovered after the stress had 
passed). People who believed that the psychologist said both true and false memories could be 
recovered (37.5% of those in the repression condition) may have disregarded images generated by 
repeated rehearsals as false recollections. Hius, they would be less likely than people who 
accurately perceived the psychologist's message to report enhanced recollection for fake scenes. 
This pattern of beliefs may have neutralized any effects theory may have had on reported memory 
characteristics. 
A related point is that people's beliefs regarding the repression and recovery of traumatic 
memories may have influenced their perceptions of what the psychologist said, and tempered the 
overall effectiveness of the theory manipulation. When participants were asked about their personal 
beliefs in the possibility of repressing and recovering memories for events that occurred under 
stressful conditions (see repression beliefs. Appendix E), most people reported believing that 
repression of such memories is possible (i.e., "the mind is capable of completely blocking out 
memories of events that occurred under stressfiil conditions"), and that both accurate and 
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inaccurate memories may later be recovered. Eighteen people in the repression condition (75%) 
and 17 people in the control condition (70.8%) expressed this pattern of beliefs. Only 4 people in 
the repression condition (16.7%) believed that only "accurate and complete memories" are likely to 
be recovered following repression. Seven people in the control condition believed that this was 
likely (29.2%). Even more problematic was the iiact that two people in the repression condition 
(8.3%, compared to 0% of people in the control condition) believed that repression of memories 
associated with stress is unlikely, and that recovered memories are likely to be inaccurate. 
Participants who did not believe in the possibility of repressing memories associated with stress or 
in the possibility of recovering accurate memories for such events were iinlikely to be affected by 
the expert's message. Hius, although repression beliel  ^were associated with reporting memories 
and confidence for fake scenes (see analysis of correlations), the majority of participants in the 
repression condition did not £4>pear to hold a strong belief in the possibility of recovering accurate 
memories following the repression of memories for stressful event 
Hiere is a fourth possible explanation for the apparent failure of the theory manipulation. 
Even when correctly interpreted, people may have had difficulty applying the psychologist's 
general message regarding the possibility of repressing and recovering memories to their own 
specific experiences in the laboratory. Participants may not have been convinced lhat it was 
possible for them to have repressed memories for scenes fiom the violent videot ,^ or that they 
would be able to recover memories for such scenes during the course of the study. 
Hie first condition that had to be met to make the idea of repression plausible was to 
expose people to a somewhat traumatic or arousing event Participants' reactions to the violent 
videotape were assessed along a number of dimensions to determine whether or not they found it 
arousing (see Videotape impressions measures. Appendix E). Participants reported their 
impressions of the violent videotape by marking six 150-mm lines with endpoints labeled not at 
all and very exdting, suspenseful, amusing, stressful, frightening, and disturbing, respectively. 
Participants perceived the violent videotape to be relatively suspenseful, fiightening, stressful, and 
disturbing (Ms = 85.13, 88.79,92.27, and 113.04, respectively), but not very exciting or amusing 
(Afs = 58.33 and 25.77, respectively). People in the control and repression groups did not 
significantly differ on these items, /s(46) = -.02 to .98, ps > .10. These results confirm that an 
arousing situation was created in which repression may have been plausible. 
The second condition that had to be met was to convince participants that fliey were 
having difficulty remembering various scenes (i.e., fake scenes) firom the violent videotape. Mean 
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MCQ scores indicated that people did, indeed, have trouble visualizing fake scenes (Session 1 M = 
2.22), adding credence to the theory that there was something from the tape that might have been 
repressed. But did people believe those scenes were reinessed, or might they have been suspicious 
from the start that the &ke scenes did not, in fact, appear in the violent videotape? 
Participants were asked to respond whether or not they believed that they might have 
repressed certain portions of the violent videot  ^(see Repression beliefs, ^ >pendix E). Ten 
people in the control condition (41.7%) and IS people in the repression condition (62.5%) ssdd 
that they did not think they had repressed anything from the violent videotape. Only 8 people in 
the repression condition (33.3%) expressed a belief tiiat diey might have repressed anything from 
the violent videotape, and only five of those people unequivocally said "yes," they believed they 
had repressed something (3 said "maybe" or "don't know"). These findings suggest that few people 
were convinced that repression was a plausible explanation for their relative lack of memory for 
fake scenes, even after having been exposed to the repression theory. Hiis makes it unlikely that 
many people believed they would be £d)le to recover any information firom the violent videotape 
that they had been luable to recall at the time of the first attempt If they did not believe there was 
anything hidden in their memories, they were not likely to recall anything more, even after 
repeated attempts were made.^  
Taken together, these findings indicate that although most people appeared to have no 
trouble believing in the possibility of repressing traumatic memories and in the possibility of 
recovering memories with some degree of accuracy at a later time, at least some people in the 
repression condition did not believe that fiill recovery of accurate memories for stressful events is 
likely. Furthermore, the majority of people (52% of the sample) did not appear to believe that 
repression and recovery were possible for them in this situation. This finding would not be 
problematic if all of those people were in the control condition. However, nearly two-thirds 
(62.5%) of participants in the repression condition were unconvinced that they had repressed 
anything from the violent videotape. Hius, the theory manipulation s^pears to have been 
ineffective not because the idea of repression was implausible in gener ,^ but because it was 
perceived as implausible in this situation. Acceptance of repression as an explanation for a lack of 
 ^ It should be pointed out that sdthough reported memory characteristics for fake scenes were 
relatively low {M = 2.14 overall), they were not nonexistent This suggests that in fact, false 
memories for fiike scenes may have been created, even though they were not influenced by the 
memory-theory manipulation. 
traumatic memories is undoubtedly more likely in a ther^utic situation, due to characteristics of 
the clients and the situation that were not recreated in this study. For instance, clients in tiierapy 
are likely to be experiencing chronic stress and a strong desire to overcome the aversiveness of 
their symptoms. In contrast, ethical considerations demand fliat flie anxiety created in a laboratory 
simation be acute and relatively benign. The suggestion of repression by a therapist is also likely 
to be much stronger and more personalized than the suggestions given in this study (e.g., Engel, 
1989). Repeatedly emphasizing the likelihood of repression and the usefiilness of recovery as a 
cure for aversive symptoms may be a powerfiil prompt to false memory reports. Although study 
participants may be willing to search for an explanation for their lack of memory, it is unlikely 
that they will be as motivated as therapy clients to discover hidden memories or to create false 
memories. 
The effects of scene type and rehearsals on MCQ scores were strong, but they did not 
correspond to effects found in an earlier study (Suengas & Johnson, 1988). Suengas and Johnson 
reported substantial improvements in MCQ scores following rehearsal of both real and imaginary 
events. In the current study, rehearsal served only to maintain memories for real events over a 
two-day period, but was ineffective at serving this fimction for fake events. However, there are 
important differences between the current study and the study reported by Suengas and Johnson. 
First, different Memory Characteristics Questionnaire items were used in the two studies. Several 
items were omitted from ^e current study due to the nature of the stimulus videotape. Hierefore, 
the same pattern would only have been expected on similar items, at best Second, differential 
rehearsal effects were reported in the Suengas and Johnson study on factor scores, whereas mean 
scores were analyzed in the current study. Because a number of MCQ items were omitted in the 
current study, similar factors could not be analyzed. Third, participants in the Suengas and Johnson 
study were provided with scripts for the imagined events, whereas in the current study, only labels 
for the events (i.e., fake scenes titles) were provided. Guiding participants through the imagery 
task by telling them what they should be visualizing moment by moment may be a more powerful 
stimulus to creating illusory memories. Finally, Suengas and Johnson postulated that the relative 
amount of rehearsal of real and imaginary events may be an important determinant of how well 
each is remembered. Specificdly, discrepancies between real and imaginary events might be most 
effectively reduced by imagining fake scenes much more often than reid scenes. Memory traces for 
real scenes are likely to be strong in the beginning but decay over time in the absence of 
rehearses. In contrast, rehearsing imaginary events may increase associated memory 
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characteristics. Therefore, the combined decay of memories for real events and improvement of 
memories for imaginary events may eventually result in relatively similar reported memories. 
Because real and fake scenes were rehearsed an equal number of times in the current study, 
memory for fake scenes was unlikely to show significant improvements relative to memory for 
real scenes. Hiis theory was not adequately tested in the current study, and remains an intriguing 
possibility for future research. 
Confidence 
People's confidence that they had actually seen particular scenes in the violent videotape 
was not influenced by the theory manipulation. People were no more confident that they had seen 
either real or fake scenes when they were told about flie possibility of repression than when such a 
possibility was not discussed. Hearing a repression-and-recoveiy theory was likely to have its 
greatest influence on memory for fake scenes, because it fnrovided an explanation for why scenes 
were not recalled, and the impetus to try to recall them. The same factors that accounted for the 
lack of theory effects on MCQ scores apply to the confidence measures. If participants were not 
convinced that diey had repressed material from the violent videotape, it is unlikely that they 
would feel confident that scenes they could not remember (i.e., fake scenes) actually appeared in 
the videotape. The fact that repeated rehearsals of certain scenes failed to result in more detailed 
memories may have reinforced people's doubts that they had ever witnessed the ^e scenes. 
Rehearsal, on the other hand, did infiuence confidence. Participants were more convinced 
that they had seen rehearsed scenes than unrehearsed scenes. Ihis was true for botti real and fake 
scenes, but the specific effects of rehearsal were slightly different depending upon scene type. The 
act of rehearsal, but not the number of rehearsals, determined how confident people were that they 
had witnessed fake scenes. People were equally confident that fake scenes rehearsed once or three 
times had ^>peared in the videotape, and they were more confident that they had witnessed the 
rehearsed fake scenes than fake scenes they had not rehearsed. On the other hand, increased 
rehearsals actually increased confidence that people had seen real scenes. People were equally 
confident in their memories for real scenes whether they were rehearsed once or not at all. Tlieir 
confidence that the real scenes had ^)peared in the videotape became even stronger after 
rehearsing real scenes three times. Thus, it took more rehearsals of scenes that were remembered 
well in the filrst place (i.e., real scenes) to enhance confidence in those memories than it did to 
enhance memories in scenes that were not remembered very well (fake scenes). 
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The fact that confidence in fake-scene memories increased is important People's 
confidence that they had witnessed scenes they had not inaeased over time when they were asked 
to focus on those scenes, even though their memory for the scenes did not improve. This suggests 
that people must have been convinced that there was something to remember, not because they 
were beginning to remember more, but because the esqperimenter told them they should remember 
more. Hie fact that people were willing to report even tiie slightest memory for scenes that did not 
occur provides evidence that people succumbed to the suggestion that they might be harboring 
hidden memories. Accepting the suggestion that one has hidden memories may be the first step in 
actually creating those memories. 
Conclusion 
The three major questions to be answered in this study were: 1) Can combined exposure to 
a memory recovery theory and suggestive memory recovery techniques induce illusory memories 
for events that never occurred?; 2) Can simple exposure to a repression and recovery theory of 
memory lead to the generation of false memories for "forgotten" events?; and 3) In the absence of 
an explicit memory recovery theory, is the use of such memory recovery techniques as imagery 
and joumalling sufficient for £alse memories to be produced? 
Despite the apparent believability and convincingness of the expert, the memory theory 
manipulation was not efTective in creating false memories for traumatic events. Memories for 
violent scenes were not differentially affected by the manipulation of exposure to a 
repression-and-recovery tiieory of memory. 
It is possible, however, tiiat fiilse memories will be produced only when an explanation for 
memory failure is combined with a method by which to retrieve memories. By now, thousands of 
people in theri^y have been exposed to the theory of repressed memories (e.g., Lindsay & Read, 
1994), but only some of them will have recovered false memories of abuse. What accounts for the 
propensity to recover false memories? No one knows, but it is likely to be a combination of Qiings 
(Lindsay & Read, 1994). Memory recovery techniques are unlikely to be used in the absence of 
theory (for examples, see Bass & Davis, 1992; Blume, 1990; Frederickson, 1992). Although in this 
study, the combination of theory and technique was not a sufficient stimulus for the creation of 
false memories, the parameters of the study may have limited the potential results. Given a longer 
delay between the stressful stimulus and the initial memory test, the accuracy of memories may 
decay and fake scenes may seem more plausible. More intensive imagery instructions inrinding 
stronger suggestions regarding the content of the fake scenes and an increased number of 
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rehearsals may also iociease the probability of stimulating fialse memory r^rts. None of ttiese 
suggestions are impossible in the laboratory, and ^1 are consistent with die type of pressure that 
may be applied in the context of some memory recovery therapies (e.g., Lindsay & Read, 1994; 
Poole et al., 1995). All provide intriguing directions for iiiture research. 
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APPENDK A: SCRIPT FOR THE REPRESSION THEORY VIDEOTAPE 
Interviewer: Dr. Smith, could you teU us a little bit about yourself? 
Psychologist: Certainly. I received my Ph.D. in clinical psychology from Wake Forest University. 
I was an intern in die psychiatric unit at New York City General Hospital before moving here to 
Minneapolis with my wife and opening my private practice. I am a member of the American 
Psychologic  ^Association, as well as tiie Division of Clinical and Counseling Psychology, and I 
have served on the Minnesota state licensing board for clinical practice. 
I: How long have you had your own practice? 
P: I've been seeing clients privately for about 17 years now. 
I: Do you specialize in any particular area of treatment? 
P: No, not really. I am willing to see people with all types of problems, or mild disorders. I have 
helped my clients deal with things like sdcohol or drug abuse, work-related stress, children with 
behavior£d problems... a litQe bit of everything really. Most of my clients are regular people who 
may appear to be functioning normally if you meet them on the street or in the grocery store, but 
do have some difficulties that they need some professional help in trying to resolve. 
I: You mentioned that you sometimes have children as clients. How imporiani do you think our 
childhood experiences are to the way that people end up as adults? 
P: Well, of coi^e our early childhood experiences affect our development in many ways. And 
often the habits that we develop, how we view the world, and so on, continue to shape what we do 
as adults. What I find interesting is the way I've seen young children react to different events. 
Their responses are quite different from how you or I might act For example, I had a mother 
bring her 5-year old son in. He had been having severe nightmares, and although he wouldn't say 
what they were about, his mother told me that the chOd had become withdrawn, and was very 
resistant to leaving the house. She informed me that the family had been in car accident during a 
vacation about a month earlier, and although no one was really hurt, she thought that the accident 
might have something to do with the changes in her son's behavior. In talking to the child over a 
period of a few weeks, it became clear that he was experiendng symptoms associated with having 
experienced a traumatic event - and yet he had no teal conscious recollection of the events 
surrounding the accident That type of situation is very complex, because the only way to help Oie 
child work through his feelings and his fears, and often his confusion, is to get the child to recall 
the event, the accident in this case, and not be threatened by it 
I: Are people's memories for traumatic events somehow Afferent from our normal memories? 
Why do people sometimes forget when something very scary happens to them? 
P: In answer to your first question, I'd say yes. People's memories for traumatic or even very 
stressful events that they experience can be quite different firom normal event memories. The 
human mind is very powerM, aiKl in some cases very adaptive to the world around us. You've 
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heard of the concept of repression. In £act, our minds are capable of repressing or completely 
blocking out our memories for things that we are consciously unable to deal with - at least at the 
time. Events that are associated with some level of stress or anxiety are especially susceptible to 
repression. Such events may not necessarily seem traumatic at the time, even to the individual 
experiencing them, but the anxiety surrounding them can lead a person to block them out 
I: Can such memories ever be recovered? 
P: When the mind does repress the memory for an event, or even a series of events, the memory 
does not simply dissqipear. Such memories are still there, stored in the brain, and can be retrieved 
or recovered with effort Hie conditions under which that can happen will vary from person to 
person, just as not every person will experience the trauma in such a way that their mind will 
repress that memory in the first place. It is the job of the then^ist, in such cases, through various 
techniques, to help the client recover that memory. 
I: How is it that people are able to suddenly "remember" something that they were unable to 
recall, sometimes for years? Some people might say that these are surely not real memories. 
P: Under conditions of extreme stress the human body undergoes a number of changes - our heart 
rate increases, we become more alert, in fact all of our senses become more active. The brain 
operates differenUy as well. In crisis situations people often must react to their environment The 
human mind will often repress the experiences that are very traumatic, keeping them from the 
conscious mind so the isdividucu can cope with the situaiiou and ultimately reuiove ihcmselves 
from the dangerous environment This type of defense mechanism is quite common. When the 
person is no longer tiu-eatened, the mind is free to release those memories, intact, into 
consciousness. Sometimes this will happen spontaneously. In other cases a ther^ist can help the 
person recover such memories. But there is no reason to believe diat these memories aren't 
accurate and relatively complete. In fact, years of clinical research support the idea that repressed 
memories for traumatic events can be recovered, and that this is an important step toward 
successful therapy. 
I: What are the techniques that therapists use to recover repressed memories, and how well do 
they work? 
P: There are any number of techniques that clinicians and therapists might use in cases of 
repressed traumatic memories. In addition to regular therapy sessions, things such as hypnosis, age 
regression, relaxation ihenqpy, guided imagery, and daily joumdling can be used to help a person 
recover memories that have been repressed during a traumatic event. 
I: Do you use any of those techniques with your patients? 
P: I personally do not use hypnosis or age regression with any of my clients although they can be 
effective tools for the recovery of repressed memories. I have had success using guided imagery 
techniques, as well as having clients keep journals of their thoughts and feelings about the 
traimiatic experience. For example, there was a woman in her late 20's who came to me because 
she was experiencing some trouble in her marriage. After she described her problems to me in a 
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bit moie detail, it became clear that her problems were deeply rooted, extending to other aspects of 
her life besides her maniage. In essence, she was having trouble adjusting in all phases of her life. 
From the symptoms she described - including a history of anxiety attacks, bingeing and purging, 
and bouts of depression ~ I began to wonder if she hadnt suffered some sort of traumatic 
experience in her childhood that might have led to these destructive patterns in her life. At first 
she couldnt piqwint any traumatic childhood incidents. In fact, she was having difficulties 
recalling substantial portions of her childhood. I felt diat these gaps in her memory might be 
significant After spending some time exploring her chQdhood memories using relaxation therapy, 
guided imagery, and joumalling techniques, Oiis young woman was able to slowly uncover and 
face a series of abusive experiences from her childhood that she had been repressing for years, and 
that clearly explained the symptoms she had been experiencing. 
I: What do you think made it possible for this woman to recall such experiences after so many 
years? 
P: There are several factors that not only ^ly to the specific case I was talking about just now, 
but to ttiese cases in general. A supportive atmosphere is very important. Often, people whose 
histories include traumatic e^riences or periods of great distress have had very little exposure to 
unconditional support. Ihey dont feel comfortable opening up. and they have difficulty trasting 
other people. So establishing an atmosphere of trust is very important And I think the specific 
techniques that I have used widi clients whom I think mi^t be harboring such memories are quite 
successful in unearthing them. Relaxation is a large part of what makes guided imagery successful. 
When we relax, our minds can open up to thoughts and ideas and even memories that we didn't 
know we had. It often takes a relaxed mind and a supportive environment for a person to feel safe 
enough to access and explore filings that normally would be blocked out of consciousness - things 
that make us anxious or uncomfortable. Free-writing, or joumalling, works in much the same way. 
When a person is able to relax and just let the words flow, and not censor the thoughts and 
feelings that are expressed, they are often surprised to find out that there is more there than they 
expected. 
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APPENDIX B: RANKING LISTS WITH REAL AND FAKE TARGET SCENES 
Real scenes a, b, c, and d, and fake scenes e, f, g, and h were used in the imagery and joumalling 
tasks. Real scenes m, n, p, and q served as fillers on both lists (i.e., were never used in the 
imagery and jounudling tasks). 
Listl: 
Man shoves jar into boy's face (m) 
Woman pouring beer into sink (n) 
Man throwing furniture during fight (e) 
House being robbed (a) 
Father tearing at daughter's clothes (f) 
Woman shot in chest (p) 
Tennis player being stalked (q) 
Boy locked in closet (b) 
List 2: 
Man shoves jar into boy's face (m) 
Woman pouring beer into sink (n) 
Woman shoots her attacker (g) 
Woman with candle in dark house (c) 
Father molesting daughter (h) 
Woman shot in chest (p) 
Tennis player being stalked (q) 
Man and woman fighting on boat (d) 
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APPENDIX C: MEMORY CHARACTERISTICS QUESTIONNAIRE 
Instructions: For each question, please circle the response that best 
describes your memory for the scene you were just imagining. 
1. My memory for this event is; 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
dim sharp/clear 
2. My memory for this event involves visual detail 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little a lot 
or none 
3. My memory for this event involves sound 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little a lot 
or none 
4. The overall vividness of my memory for this event is: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
vague very vivid 
5. My memory for the event is; 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
sketchy very detailed 
6. My memory for the location where the event takes place is; 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
vague clear/distinct 
7. Relative spatial arrangement of objects in my memory for the event is; 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
vague clear/distinct 
8. Relative spatial arrangement of people in my memory for the event is; 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
vague clear/distinct 
9. The event seems: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
short long 
10. I remember how I felt at the time when the event took place; 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all definitely 
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11. feelings at the time were: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
negative positive 
12. My feelings at the time were: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not intense very intense 
13. As I am remembering now, my feelings are: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not intense very intense 
14. I remember what I was thinking at the time: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all clearly 
15. Overall, I remember this event: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
hardly very well 
16. I remember events that took place in advance of the event: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all clearly 
17. I remember events that took place after the event: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all clearly 
18. Do you have any doubts about the accuracy of your memory for this 
event? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
a great no doubt 
deal of doubt whatsoever 
Additional Questions included'on the Session 2 MCQ: 
19. Since it happened, I have thought about this event: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all many times 
20. Since it happened, I have talked about this event: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all many times 
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APPENDIX D: CONFIDENCE RATINGS 
How confident are you Oat eacb of the scenes listed below appeared in the violent videot  ^you watched 
two days ago? For each scene, write a number in the blank that corre^onds to how confident you are that 
you actually saw the scene. Some of the scenes listed may not have appeared in the videotape you watched. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all con l^etely 
confident confident 
WOMAN BEATEN IN FRONT OF MIRROR 
TENNIS PLAYER BEING STALKED 
FATHER MOLESTING DAUGHTER 
WOMAN TOYING TO COOK A TV DINNER 
WOMAN SHOT IN CHEST 
CHILDREN WATCHING PARENTS HGHT 
BOY LOCKED IN CLOSET 
WOMAN SHOOTS ATTACKER 
MAN SHOVES JAR INTO BOY'S FACE 
WOMEN HGHTING IN ATHC 
BOY STABBING WOMAN IN BED 
BOYS PLAYING FOOTBALL 
FATHER TEARING AT DAUGHTER'S CLOTHES 
MAN AND WOMAN HGHTING ON BOAT 
WOMAN POURING BEER INTO SINK 
WOMEN GETTING HAIR CUT OFF 
GIRL MOLESTED AT PARTY 
WOMAN WITH CANDLE IN DARK HOUSE 
TRAIN CRASHES INTO TRUCK 
MAN THROWING FURNITURE DURING HGHT 
HOUSE BEING ROBBED 
WOMAN CHASED BY MEN IN CAR 
WOMAN HIDES BEHIND DOOR 
MAN AND TWO BOYS HSHING 
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APPENDIX E: MANIPULATION CHECKS AND ANCILLARY MEASURES 
Manipulation Checks 
Memory theory condition: 
What did the psycbologist in the videot  ^conclude about die effects of stress on memory and die way the 
mind woiks? 
a) The mind will sometimes completely block out memories of events that occurred under stressful 
conditions, and accurate and complete memories can be lecoveied later, after the stress has passed. 
b) The mind will sometimes completely block out monoiies of events that occurred under stressful 
conditions, and although some true memories may be recovered after the stress has passed, some 
false information will also be recovered. 
c) The mind generally does not block out memories of events that occurred under stressful 
ccmditions, and any "monories" that are eventually recovered are likely to be Calse. 
d) I did not see a videotaped memory expert 
Number of rehearsals: 
What day and at what time of day did you do the take-home imagination and joumalling exercise? 
How much time did you spend on the take-home imaginaticm and joumalling exercise? (specify in minutes) 
Ancillary measures 
Repression beliefs: 
One theory of memory states that the mind will sometimes repress, or blodc out, certain memories when 
these memories are associated with shock or distress. Do you think diat you might have repressed certain 
portions of the violent videotape? 
Which of the following statments best summarizes your own personal views about the effects of stress on 
memory and die way the mind worics? 
a) The mind generally does not block out memories of events that occurred under stressful 
ccmditions, and any "memories" diat are eventually recovered are likely to be £alse. 
b) The mind is citable of completely blocking out memories of events that occurred under stressful 
conditions, and accurate and complete memories can be recovered later, after die stress has passed. 
c) The mind is c^^le of completely blocking out memories of events that occurred under stressful 
coDditimis, and although some true memories may be recovered after the stress has passed, some 
false informati(Hi will also be recovered. 
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Reactions to videotaped psychologist: (Experimental condition only) 
How would you tate the competrace of the psydiologist in the videot^? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all completely 
competent competent 
How believable was the psychologist's discussion of the woman he saw who recovered repressed memories? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all completely 
believable believable 
How convincing was the psychologist's presentation about how memoiy woiics? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all completely 
cmvincing convincing 
Additional questions: (Session 2, all participants) 
How many times did images fiom the violent fihn clips spontaneoMslv come to mind over the last 48 hours 
(when you weren't trying to remember them)? 
Compared to 48 hours ago, how much infonnation from the violent videot  ^do you think you remember 
now? 
a) mudi less than before 
b) somewhat less than before 
c) about the same as before 
d) somewhat more than before 
e) much more flian before 
Have you seen any of these movies before? (Other than in the fihn clips.) Please indicate in the first space 
preceding the movie name how many times you have seen that film. In the second space, indicate how 
ItHig ago you last saw that fihn: 
Needfid Hiings 
Playing for Time Marie: A True Story 
True Romance Cold Comfort 
Radio Flyer Blue Steel 
The Burning Bed 
The Stranger 
This Boy's Life 
The Stepfather 
Dead Again 
Dead Calm 
68 
Ease of Visualization Questions: 
Please indicate by maridng a slasb on tbe line bow easy or difficult it was for you to visualize eacb of the 
eight scenes. 
Scene#: 
Extremely easy Extremely hard 
to visualize to visualize 
Videotape impressions: (Session 1) 
What were your overall impressions of tbe violoit videotape that you watched? Make a slash marie 
indicating your impressions on eacb of tbe following dimensions. 
not at all very 
exciting 
L 
exciting 
not at all 
.. 
very 
suspensefiil 
1 -
suspensefiil 
1 
not at all very 
amusmg 
1- - - - -
amusmg 
. 1 
not at aU very 
stressful stressful 
not at all 
frightening 
very 
frightening 
not at all 
disturbing 
very 
disturbing 
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APPENDIX F: IMAGERY AND JOURNALLIN6 INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR THE TAKE-HOME TASK 
In two days, you will be coming back to the lab to answer some questions about your memory for 
the violent events on the first videotape you saw today. In tiie meantime, you are asked to spend 
some time thinking about the scenes and writing down what you can remember from them. Below 
is a list of four scenes from the videot  ^that you indicated you had difficulty remembering. 
Around this time tomorrow, you are asked to spend 2 minutes thinking about, and up to S minutes 
writing about what you can remember from each scene on this list You should repeat the imagery 
procedure you followed today for each of the four scenes: Close your eyes and try to imagine the 
specific scene. Run it through your mind from start to finish. You should actually try to SEE the 
scene before your eyes, and watch a& it goes by. After about 2 minutes, stop and write down as 
much as you can remember about the scene in your blue book, including what you remember 
seeing, hearing, thinking, and feeling as you watched the scene. Repeat this process for each of the 
scenes. 
Scene 1: 
Scene 2: 
Scene 3: 
Scene 4: 
nease remember to bring your Journal (blue book) back with you in two days! 
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APPENDIX G; STUDY PROTOCOL 
INITIAL SESSION: 
1. Greet and give a brief introduction to the study. 
"Hi, are you (name)? How are you? Thank you for coming. My name is . As you 
probably noticed on the posting form, dite is a study on wranen's reactions to media violence. Before I give 
you the consent form, I want to make sure you understand what you will be asked to do in this study. If you 
asree to participate, you will watch a short videot  ^of some movie clips today, and then answer some 
questions about them. Hiis stu<fy requires that you come back in two days to answer some additional 
questiois about the t .^ You also be asked to fiU out some materials at home and bring them with you 
when you come back in two days. You will get 2 credits if you complete the study, which should take 
about two hours total." 
"The videott  ^that you are gcrag to see contains some scenes that portray violent acts and human 
suffering, but all the scenes are from Hollywood-produced, commerdally released movies. I need to warn 
you that some scenes include partial nudity, bleeding wounds, and profaiiity. Do you feel like you're dcay 
with watching the videot^?" (If not, tell her that's fine; debrief, give credit, and send hcnne.) 
"The take-home materials should only take about 20 minutes to complete. Do you think that you 
will have some free time available to do that part? Will you be able to come back for 
a second session in two days? That would be at this time on (2 days later)." 
"Here is a consent form I would like you to read and sign before we begin, indicating your 
willingness to participate in the study. Let me remind you that if at any time in this experiment you feel that 
this is too much for you, you are free to withdraw." 
2. Have the participant read and sign the consent form and give the participant an extra credit card. 
3. "I'm going to give you a set of headphones to put on when you're ready to view the tape. If at any time 
you find the t  ^too disturbing and wish to stop watching it, you can just press the STOP button. After you 
have watched die tape, I will give you a questionnaire that will ask you various things about what you saw." 
4. Show the participant how to operate the VCR, and give her the headphones. Tell her to start the tape 
whenever she is ready. Turn off the VCR when the tcpe finishes. 
5. Give her the video impressions questionnaire (exciting-disturbing ratings). 
"The fust questionnaire I'd like you to fill out asks about your overall reactions to the tape you just 
watched." 
6. While she is filUng out the video impressions questionnaire, consult the running list to see which ranking 
list she should receive (1 or 2). 
1. Pick up the video impressions questionnaire when she is through 
"In this study, we are also interested in the effect that violence has on memory, so the next tiling I'd 
like you to do is look at a list of some of the clips you saw in the videot .^ (Give her the ranking list) 
Overall, these scenes were rated among the ones that people in previous studies had the most difficulty 
remembering. What I would like you to do is rank them fiom one to eight in terms of how well you 
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lemonber them. I am interested in your ovcraO rating of the scene, not one just based on an actor you 
recognized or a specific event you remembered. You sbould think about how well you can reconstruct the 
entire scene in your mind fiom beginning to end and base your judgment on that Number one should be the 
scene you can remember die most, and nundier dght should be the scene you can rememba the least." 
If a partic^ant aqtresses tUfficuUy in remembering a scene or says that she doesn't think she saw a 
scene, assure her that it is normal to have memory problems for materials of this nature, and tell 
her that she can just rank that scene low on the list. 
8. After she completes the ranking task, explain: 
"We know from past research that sometimes memory for events associated with anxiety or fear can 
be disrupted, so any trouble you might have had imembering certain scenes is perfectly normal. One of die 
questions we're asking in this study is whether or not certain techniques can help to improve memcvy for 
disturbing or stressful experiences. In this study we are testing a couple of these different techniques." 
"1 am gdng to t^e four of the scenes you indicated having some trouble with, and we are going to 
work on your memory for than, okay? We're going to use a variation of a technique caUed 'guided imagery.' 
What this means is I'm going to ask you to close your eyes and try to visualize each scene for ^ ut 2 
minutes. During that time, I will ask you to think iriwut a specific scoie, running it through your mind from 
beginning to end. I want you to try to actually SEE the scene before your eyes, and watch it as it goes by. 
Do you understand what I mean?" 
9. Consult the running sheet to determine the order in which the four scenes (A, B,E,&F if she got 
Ranking list I: C, D,G,&.H if she got List 2) should be imagined You will use the four target scenes 
indicated on the running sheet even if the participant did not rank dtese four scenes lowest (as the four 
she remembered the least). 
10. Give the participant imagery instructions for the first scene: 
"Okay, now I would like you to close your eyes, relax and try to imagine the (name of the 
appropriate) scene. I want you to try to "see" tl  ^scene as if you were watching it on the tape again. Try to 
remember the details you saw and die sounds Aat you heard. Remember what you were thii^g and feeling 
as you watched the scene. Run through the scene as many times as you can. If you find this scene hard to 
remember, that's dcay. Just relax and try to focus. You can start now." 
She might say that she doesn't remember the scene at all or that she is having a hard time remembering 
it. Tell her that it is okay, but you would like her to imagine it for two minutes. It is important to encourage 
a belief that this scene mav have occurred. If she still doesn't remember anything about the scene after 
trying to imagine it, she will be able to indicate that on the MCQ. 
11. Time the imagery task on the first scene for 1 minute and 30 seconds. 
When time is up: 
"Okay, you can open your eyes. I am going to give you a questionnaire that asks you to describe 
certain aspects of your memory for the scene you just tiiought about Try to answer the questions as well as 
you can." 
Give her a Memory Characteristics Questionnaire for Scene 1. Pick it up when she is through. 
72 
12. Repeat the imagery task followed by an MCQ (steps II and 12) for each of the 3 remaining scenes, in 
the order spec^d on the running sheet. For each scene, repeat tite imagery instructions that appear in 
step II and the MCQ instructions in step 12. 
13. Check the running sheet to see if the participant is assigned to the control or experimental condition. 
Participants in the experimental condition will now watch a videotape of an "expert" talking about the 
theory of repression. The participants in the control condition wHl not see this videotape. 
14a. EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION ONLY: 
Cue up second videotape of "expert" talking about imagery and repression. Continue: 
"I'm going to ask you to watdi another short videoti  ^containing an int^iew with a professional 
psychologist In diis t£q)e the psychologist will describe how he uses imagery as a therapeutic tool with some 
of his own clients. Hell be explaining the benefits of using diese techniques to improve people's ability to 
recall previous information." 
When the tape is finished, continue; 
"I wanted to show you that videotq)e as an example of bow techniques similar to Oie ones we're 
using have been i^lied in other settings. The psydiologist in the tape was explaining a common theory 
about how traumatic memories can be repressed, and describing how he's used certain techniques to recover 
hidden m^ories. What we're doing in this study is testing whether or not the techniques he talked about are 
helpfiil for retrieving memories for stressfiil and disturbing events." 
Participants in the experimental condition now follow the same procedure as the control condition, as 
described below. 
14b. CONTROL CONDITION: 
Give the participant a blue book and set of joumalling instructions to take home. Write the four scene 
names on the instruction sheet in the order they were imagined. Print the date and time the participant is to 
return and the participant's code number on the front. 
"In two days, you will be coming back here to answer some questions about your memory for the 
events on the violent videotape you saw today. In tibe meantune, I would like you to spend a few more 
minutes thinking about the scenes we worked on today. I am giving you a blue book to take heme that has a 
set of instructims and list of scenes inside the front cover." 
Show the participant the sheet and go through the instructions with her. 
"Around this time tomorrow, if diat's possible, I'd like you to spoid a little time at home trying to 
visualize each of the four scenes you thought about today. The sheet inside your blue bo(dc lists the scenes 
in the order I'd like you to work on them. Instead of filling out a questionnaire after you imagine each scene 
like you did today, what Td like you to do is write down as much as you can remember ^ut the scene. Do 
you understand what you're going to be doing? Will you be able to t^e a few minutes around this time 
tomorrow and complete this task?" 
Ask her to make sure she does the imagery and joumalling task before she comes back, even if she 
forgets to do it when she is supposed to. 
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"Before you sit down to do the imagery task vmonow, please go over the instructions inside the 
blue book and follow them careftilly. Please remember to bring your blue bode back with you on (day she is 
to return)." 
15. Answer any questions and thank her. 
SECOND SESSION: 
Before the partidpant arrives: 
Get eight Session 2:20-item MCQs and final questionnaires ready. Mark the MCQs and "Ease of 
Imagining" questionnaire with the scene names in the order that they appear on the running sheet. The first 
fi)ur scenes will be the ones that the participant rehearsed during ti^  first session and at home, in the same 
order as before. The last four MCQs should be marked with the names of the second set of four scenes in 
the order specified on the running sheet for session 2. 
When die participant arrives: 
1. Collect journal; hand out extra credit card. If the participant has forgotten her journal, ask her to drop it 
off later. 
2. "If you remember, last time I told you we are interested in testing different tediniques used to improve 
people's memory for stressful or disti^ing events. Today we're gdng to use the guided imagery task again 
on a few scenes. So, just as before I am going to give you a scene and I would like you to just relax, close 
your eyes and try to actually see the events in the scene." 
3. "Okay, I would like you to relax and try to imagine the (name of the impropriate) scene. I want you to try 
to "see" this scene as if you were watching it on die tape again. Follow the action as it occurs. Try to 
remember the details you saw, the sounds that you heard, and what you were thinking and feeling as you 
watched the scene. Run through die scene as many times as you can. If you find this scene hard to 
rranember, that's doty. Just relax and try to focus. You can start now." 
4. After 1 minute and 30 seconds have passed: 
"Okay, you can open your eyes. Now I'm going to give you a questionnaire that asks you to 
describe certain aspects of your memory for the scene you just thought about Try to complete it the best 
you can." 
Give the participant a Session 2 MCQ labeled with the scene name. 
5. Repeat the imagery task and MCQ (steps 3 and 4) in order for the other three scenes she rehearsed 
before. 
6. Consult the running sheet to determine the order for the second set of scenes to be imagined. If she did 
ABEF first, she'll do CDGH now, and vice versa. Read these instructions: 
"Now, for comparison purposes, Hn going to ask you to imagine four more scenes from the 
videot .^ We will follow the same procedure as we have been. I'll give you the name of a scene, give you 
a few seconds to get relaxed, and then well begin the imagery task. Okay?" 
74 
Repeat steps 3 and 4 (the imagery task for each scene, immediately followed by an MCQ) for the second set 
of four scenes in the order spec^d on the running sheet. 
7. "Okay, I have a final set of questionnaiies for you to complete, and then I will take a few minutes to 
summarize the study for you and answer any questions you might have." 
Give her the final questionnaire (3 pages) in this order: 
J) Ease of visualization; 
2) repression, movies, demographics; 
3) confidence ratings. 
8. Debrief participant; 
"I would like to thank you for particqnting ia Oiis study. I'm going to spend just a few minutes 
summarizing die goals of this research project" 
"Two days ago, you watched a videotape that included some gr^hic scenes of violence and human 
injury that were selected from R-rated Hollywood films. You might be wondering why we used 
splice-together film clips mstead of showing one continuous scene. We are interested in people's memories 
for fiast-paced, emotionally arousing events. When people view material that is fast-paced, complex, and 
constantly changing, it can be very difficult to remember much of what Aey saw. Some things just h^)pen 
too fast to notice die details, and the continuous dianges firom one scene to another can produce interference 
in memory. In this case, mterference occurs when the scene bemg viewed prevents you firom thinking about 
the scene you just fini^ed viewing, so your memory for the previous scene is disrupted. This type of 
memory disturbance is very conmion." 
"An important question we are studying involves the possibility that people's beliefs about how 
memory works can affect their later rqxms about what they rememb .^ We know that pec^le scHnetimes 
report remembeiing events that they did not actually experience but instead simply imagined or confused 
with other memories. This might be especially likely to happen when people are led to believe that they 
have memories that have been repressed, or when they have made repeated attempts to remember events." 
"In this study, some people saw a videotape of an expert who suggested that repression is a very 
real phenomenon, and that the recovery of repressed memories is possible at a later time. We are testing the 
hypothesis that pr:7le who are led to believe in memory repression and recovery will report mrae memories 
and be more confidait in the accuracy of their memories than people who weie not exposed to a rqnession 
and recovery theory. We are also pre^cting that monories for scenes that were imagined a number of times 
will be stronger than mmories for scenes that were only imagined once." 
"If you viewed the videotape of the expert discussing the possibility of repression, you should be 
aware that we don't think it is likely that you actually rqnessed any memories of violent scenes frnn the 
videotq)e. Your fiailure to recall everythmg from the violent video was more likely due to normal limitations 
on the amount and rate at which people can process and store complex information. We used the violent 
materials to make it seem more plausible that repression of parts of die video was possible. We are not 
suggesting that repression never occurs or that no recovered memories are valid. We just do not think it is 
likely under diese 
circumstances." 
"Do you understand the purpose of this study? Do you have any questions about the study?" 
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"I would like to ask you again not to tell anyone about the details of this study. Because of the 
nature of diis researdi, it is important that people who particqkate are unaware of the specific scenes they 
might see and the questions they will be asked to answer. We want people's memories to be based on what 
they actually saw, rather than what diey might have heard about Do you understand why it is important not 
to tell anyone about die details of this study and specific scenes they might be asked about?" 
"Your co(q)eration is greatly {qtineciated. One last diing Fd like to mention is that there is a 
possibili  ^Oat some people may esqierience smne lingering discomfort &om watching the violent video 
scenes. We are encouraging peq>le to call us if this hqipens so we can he  ^them deal with that, or to direct 
them to someone at the Student Counseling Center. We want petqde to have a positive research experience. 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study after you leave today, feel fiee to contact the project 
supervisor. Sheila Seelau, at the phone number listed on die posting form for this study." 
"Do you have any questions about the study? Thanks again for your help." 
76 
APPENDIX H: MEANS FOR 2x2x3 ANOVA ON MCQ SCORES 
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) Means by Memory 
Theory, Scene Type and Rehearsal 
Rehearsals 
Time 1 Time 2 
Scene lype 113 
Real 
Repression 4.40 3.52 4.54 
(0.78) (0.84) (0.81) 
Control 4.53 3.48 4.36 
(0.81) (1.05) (0.88) 
Fake 
Repression 2.40 2.20 1.98 
(1.02) (1.05) (0.84) 
Control 2.04 2.18 2.07 
(0.89) (0.88) (0.90) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. 
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APPENDK I: MEANS FOR 2x2x3 ANOVA ON CONFIDENCE 
Confidence Means by Memory Theory, Scene Type and Rehearsal 
Rehearsals 
Time 1 Time 2 
Scene l^pe 
Real 
Repression 5.83 5.44 6.60 
(0.70) (1.31) (0.68) 
Control 5.79 5.42 6.85 
(0.81) (1.65) (0.54) 
Fake 
Repression 1.87 2.67 2.35 
(0.84) (1.56) (1.27) 
Control 1.70 2.42 2.31 
(0.90) (1.74) (1.84) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. 
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APPENDIX J: MCQ ITEM MEANS 
Means and Standard Deviations for Memory Characteristics Questionnaire Items 1-4 
Real Scenes Fake Scenes 
Rehearsals Rehearsals 
Time 
1 
Time 2 Time 
1 
Time 2 
1 1 3 1 1 3 
MCQl 
Repression 4.90 3.98 5.40 2.13 2.23 1.83 
(1.18) (1.38) (1.01) (1.20) (1.27) (1.08) 
Control 5.25 4.10 5.29 1.92 2.31 1.94 
(1.18) (1.34) (1.24) (1.14) (1.22) (1.25) 
MCQ2 
Repression 5.38 4.13 5.52 2.52 2.23 1.90 
(0.95) (1.23) (1.03) (1.50) (1.31) (1.02) 
Control 5.58 4.31 5.42 2.00 2.42 2.02 
(1.21) (1.70) (1.39) (1.29) (1.56) (1.50) 
MCQ3 
Repression 3.69 2.85 3.85 1.83 1.85 1.63 
(1.63) (1.23) (1.33) (1.16) (1.03) (0.88) 
Control 3.79 3.35 3.92 2.00 1.94 1.77 
(1.62) (1.56) (1.58) (1.09) (1.31) (1.04) 
MCQ4 
Repression 4.73 3.85 5.06 2.13 2.00 1.69 
(1.19) (1.31) (1.21) (1.25) (1.24) (0.91) 
Control 5.10 4.02 5.21 1.75 2.10 1.73 
(1.22) (1.48) (1.23) (0.99) (1.21) (0.96) 
79 
Means and Standard Deviations for Memory Characteristics Questionnaire Items 5-8 
Real Scenes Fake Scenes 
Rehearsals Rehearsals 
Time 
1 
Time 2 Time 
1 
Time 2 
1 1 3 1 1 3 
MCQ5 
Repression 4.83 3.73 5.04 1.96 1.92 1.75 
(1.14) (1.25) (1.21) (1.21) (1.22) (1.00) 
Control 4.79 3.79 5.00 1.71 2.02 1.77 
(1.30) (1.55) (1.25) (1.03) (1.14) (1.03) 
MCQ6 
Repression 5.90 4.52 5.73 2.15 2.04 1.94 
(1.16) (1.42) (1.12) (1.26) (1.33) (1.10) 
Control 5.96 4.67 5.71 1.73 2.06 2.00 
(1.89) (1.75) (1.32) (0.97) (1.41) (1.33) 
MCQ7 
Repression 4.60 3.52 4.98 2.02 1.83 1.77 
(1.21) (1.17) (1.16) (1.08) (1.21) (1.02) 
Control 4.71 3.73 4.92 1.52 1.98 1.65 
(1.42) (1.63) (1.50) (0.90) (1.03) (0.89) 
MCQ8 
Repression 5.35 4.19 5.46 2.25 2.08 1.85 
(1.26) (1.25) (1.15) (1.28) (1.30) (1.12) 
Control 5.44 4.19 5.52 1.96 2.10 2.00 
(1.28) (1.68) (1.37) (1.23) (1.23) (1.32) 
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Means and Standard Deviations for Memory Characteristics Qjuestionnaire 
Items 9-12 
Real Scenes Fake Scenes 
Rehearsals Rehearsals 
Time Time 2 Time Time 2 
1 1 
1 1 3  1 1 3  
MCQ9 
Repression 3.90 3.67 4.56 2.81 2.65 2.46 
(0.97) (1.38) (1.35) (1.39) (1.45) (1.44) 
Control 3.77 3.63 4.17 1.98 2.38 2.38 
(1.32) (1.46) (1.54) (1.05) (1.41) (1.53) 
MCQIO 
Repression 4.67 3.40 4.71 2.38 2.15 1.81 
(1.09) (1.48) (1.31) (1.32) (1.37) (1.05) 
Control 4.92 3.08 4.31 1.94 2.04 1.77 
(1.38) (1.86) (1.69) (1.11) (1.24) (0.96) 
MCQll 
Repression 2.31 2.25 2.63 2.23 2.40 2.21 
(1.02) (1.06) (1.19) (1.09) (1.22) (1.10) 
Control 2.35 2.69 2.50 2.31 2.54 2.69 
(0.91) (1.01) (1.00) (1.04) (1.17) (1.20) 
MCQ12 
Repression 4.63 4.46 4.83 4.27 3.92 3.79 
(1.20) (1.18) (1.10) (1.62) (1.56) (1.59) 
Control 4.48 4.08 4.38 3.58 3.60 3.48 
(1.10) (1.29) (1.24) (1.33) (1.65) (1.49) 
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Means and Standard Deviations for Memory Characteristics Questionnaire 
Items 13-16 
Real Scenes Fake Scenes 
Rehearsals Rehearsals 
Time 
1 
Time 2 Time 
1 
Time 2 
MCQ13 
Repression 3.85 3.04 3.48 3.63 2.60 2.46 
(1.17) (1.45) (1.56) (1.51) (1.62) (1.57) 
Control 3.60 2.10 2.69 2.90 2.17 2.29 
(1.19) (0.93) (1.34) (1.44) (1.51) (1.52) 
MCQ14 
Repression 4.50 3.38 4.50 2.35 2.08 1.77 
(1.33) (1.51) (1.41) (1.39) (1.39) (1.08) 
Control 4.85 3.15 4.19 1.88 2.06 1.88 
(1.39) (1.77) (1.72) (1.18) (1.41) (1.12) 
MCQ15 
Repression 4.96 3.81 5.23 2.10 2.02 1.63 
(1.13) (1.42) (1.34) (1.30) (1.26) (0.89) 
Control 5.23 4.06 5.33 1.77 2.04 1.88 
(1.15) (1.50) (1.27) (0.96) (1.05) (1.15) 
MCQ16 
Repression 3.25 2.46 2.94 2.04 1.81 1.69 
(1.29) (1.49) (1.75) (1.52) (1.55) (1.14) 
Control 3.27 1.83 2.33 1.79 1.42 1.75 
(1.70) (1.06) (1.38) (1.22) (0.72) (1.28) 
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Means and Standard Deviations for Memory Characteristics Questionruiire 
Items 17-18 
Real Scenes Fake Scenes 
Rehearsals Rehearsals 
Time Time 2 Time Time 2 
1 1 
1 1 3  1 1 3  
MCQ17 
Repression 3.02 2.42 2.92 2.08 1.81 1.83 
(1.49) (1.43) (1.75) (1.49) (1.55) (1.27) 
Control 3.27 1.90 2.25 1.79 1.40 1.75 
(1.59) (1.29) (1.43) (1.26) (0.69) (1.32) 
MCQ18 
Repression 4.67 3.79 4.83 2.17 1.90 1.56 
(1.44) (1.57) (1.37) (1.32) (1.28) (0.88) 
Control 5.15 3.90 5.29 2.42 2.65 2.48 
(1.24) (1.86) (1.45) (1.89) (1.91) (2.04) 
